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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Rule
14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012.5 (as
amended).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether the Murray City Civil Service Commission (hereinafter

"Commission") erred in excluding evidence of retaliatory motives, bias and intent of
witnesses Lt. Pete Fondaco and Chief Kenneth Killian;
2.

Whether the Commission erred in finding that there was substantial

evidence to support the charge that petitioner, Edward J. Lucas ("Officer Lucas"), had
lied during an internal affairs investigation;
3.

Whether the Commission erred in finding that the termination of Officer

Lucas' employment was consistent and proportionate with the alleged offense;
4.

Whether the Commission erred in preventing Officer Lucas's counsel

from impeaching Martin Spegar's testimony by playing an audiotape containing Mr.
Spegar's inconsistent statements;
5.

Whether the Commission erred in permitting its legal adviser to question

witnesses and comment on the evidence on the record (Petitioner's objection is
preserved at R. 633; 678); and
6.

Whether the Commission erred in affirming the termination of Officer

Lucas when the internal affairs investigation was not completed within thirty days as
required by Murray City Police Department Policy 555, III (E), and when Officer Lucas
was not given written notification of the charges against him as required by Murray
City Police Department Policy 555, III (G).
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review for issues (1), (4), (5) and (6) is a correction of
error standard, giving no deference to the Commission's decision. King v. Industrial
Comm'n. of Utah, 850 P.2d 1281 (Utah App. 1993).
The standard of review for issues (2) and (3) is an abuse of discretion
standard. Child v Salt Lake City Civ. Serv. Comm'n.. 575 P.2d 195 (Utah 1978).
STATUTES. ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS
Utah Constitution Article XI, Sec. 5
Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-1001 to 06
Utah Code Ann. §78-24-1
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rules 103; 608; 1007
Murray City Civil Service Commission Rules and Regulations, §§ 3-4;
11-1; 13-10
Murray City Police Department Policy 555, III
Department of Human Resource Management Rule 477-1 l-l(3)(e)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
On August 21,1996, Officer Lucas wasfiredby the Murray City Police
Department ("Police Department") for allegedly lying to his superiors during an internal
affairs investigation concerning a claim of excessive force. Significantly, no discipline
was given for excessive force because the charge was never substantiated.
Nevertheless, the Murray City Corporation (sometimes hereinafter "Murray City" or
the "City") terminated Officer Lucas' employment, claiming that his statements during
the investigation were dishonest because they appeared to be inconsistent.
Officer Lucasfiledan appeal with the Commission challenging his
dismissal. Prior to the hearing, the Commission entered an order preventing Officer
Lucasfrompresenting any evidence that the decision to terminate his employment was

248U40608.3

2

etaliation few reporting police corruption and

Il net in Uit I lull; aiome>

"•ral's Office.
On November .
mission issued a decision on
'w*

!

~

"

lie L itv * dismissal of

administrative hearing that Officer Lucas appeals to this
L He urge* uus Cou, ,- revc

"'

I

I tetwiinfr him .r. ."in

oer or in the alternative, t*

I

it

^ucaswa*
Departme"1 He appealed to the Commission on S
Commissioi
1996, the Comn

oer 27, 1996. I he

-~ • +>
-:1

, ,,

On Nr* ember 27,

^

, «^msem,

• C , Disp usition in Ti ial C cm u i Il: ici i \ gen cj
OnNovembe r 27, 1996, th z Cc mmissi • n entered Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law affr

. tht

"s termination c f Officer Luca< »"' ni|: Il .' ; iiinent.

*s ci , "cas was a ptav.
Department
I

Oep«"»^*

> ? 1996. riis v
«v«

'

i the

He received the achievement award which is the

highest honor the City can give a law" eiiforcemeni
779).
is assisted a fellow officer in the arrest
of Martin S
x

M

~ partment without

Meas reque c

me Police Department
empty his pockets. Rather than emptying *_ r
248U40608.3

_

3

,! i Ii, S|

the inside of his pants toward his crotch as if reaching for a weapon. Officer Lucas
immediately unsnapped his gun holster, placed his hand on the gun grip and forced Mr.
Spegar to the wall. He then conducted a thorough search of Mr. Spegar, finding a pair
of pliers and a small flashlight in his possession. Mr. Spegar was subsequently taken to
jail without incident. (R. 793; 794; 795).
5.

Mr. Spegar did not complain that he was mistreated while at the Police

Department. Thefirstnotice of a problem came two weeks later when a handwritten
statement from Mr. Spegar was delivered to the Police Department. The statement
alleges that a bald peace officer pointed a gun to Mr. Spegar's head and threatened to
kill him. (R. 284; 285-6).
6.

Lt. Peter Fondaco of the Police Department commenced an internal

affairs investigation on June 10,1996. The purpose of the investigation was to
determine whether Officer Lucas had used excessive force in his arrest and subsequent
search of Mr. Spegar. Lt. Fondaco did not provide Officer Lucas with a written
statement of the charge as required by Police Department policy. (R. 302-10; 708-11).
7.

During the interrogation by Lt. Fondaco, Officer Lucas described his

arrest and treatment of Mr. Spegar. Officer Lucas stated that he felt threatened when
Mr. Spegar reached under his pants, rather than emptying his pockets. Officer Lucas
stated that he instinctively unsnapped his holster and placed his hand on the gun grip.
Officer Lucas then described his search of Mr. Spegar. (R 302-10).
8.

Officer Lucas told Lt. Fondaco that he did not remember removing his

gunfromhis holster. Officer Lucas was subsequently informed that Officer Snow saw
him with his gun to his side while he was in the room with Mr. Spegar. In a second
interrogation, Officer Lucas indicated that he did not remember removing his gun from
his holster, but admitted that it was possible since he had his attention focused on Mr.
Spegar's threatening actions. Officer Lucas adamantly denies pointing his gun at Mr.
Spegar or threatening to kill him. (R. 302-10; 801-2; 805).
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lude all evidence

included evidence that the police administration recently discovered that it was Officer
Lucas who had complained to the Attorney General's Office. (R. 142-7).
17.

Understandably, Lt. Fondaco and Chief Killian denied that they knew it

was Officer Lucas who had reported the police corruption and misconduct to the Utah
Attorney General's Office. (R. 134-5; 136-7).
18.

The Commission excluded any evidence on the issue of retaliatory

motives, intent and bias of Lt. Fondaco or Chief Killian. (R. 162-3).
19.

The Commission held an evidentiary hearing on November 19,1996.

At the evidentiary hearing, the Commission's legal adviser questioned the witnesses and
commented on the evidence over Officer Lucas' objections. The Commission, through
its legal adviser, also prevented Officer Lucas' counselfromusing the audiotape of the
polygraph examination to impeach the testimony of Martin Spegar. (R. 611-13; 632-5;
674-5) (See also, record citations catalogued in Section V, infra).
20.

Officer Lucas presented evidence to the Commission that in the three

prior cases involving peace officer dishonesty, Murray City had terminated the
employment of one junior officer who had falsified police reports, while only
suspending the other two officers. (R. 755-8).
21.

On November 27,1996, the Commission affirmed the termination of

Officer Lucas' employment. (R. 217-225)
22.

On December 12,1996, Officer Lucas filed his Petition for Review

with this Court. (R. 228-29).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The Commission Erred in Excluding Evidence of Retaliatory
Motive, Intent and Bias

Officer Lucas identified two fact witnesses who would testify or corroborate
Officer Lucas' testimony that he had been discharged in retaliation for participating in
an Attorney General's investigation of alleged misconduct and corrupt practices of the
Murray City Police Department. Murray City filed a Motion in Limine to prevent such
248U40608.3
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information from being disclosed at the evidentiary hearing. The Commission granted
the City's motion.
The Commission's evidentiary ruling violates Murray City's rules and policies
which allow an officer the right to a full hearing prior to a termination, violates the rules
of evidence that allow parties to present all relevant evidence, and is contrary to the
evidentiary rules regarding admissibility of evidence to impeach witnesses or to show
bias.
2.

The Commission Erred in Finding that there was Sufficient
Evidence to Support the Charge that Officer Lucas Lied
During an Internal Affairs Investigation

There was insufficient evidence presented to the Commission to find that
Officer Lucas had lied during the internal affairs investigation. The City failed to
affirmatively establish good cause for the termination. Because the evidence presented
does not provide "substantial support" for the decision, the decision must be vacated as
a matter of law.
3.

The Commission Erred in Not Finding The Discipline
Excessive and Disproportionate to the Alleged Offense

Officer Lucas is a twelve-year veteran of law enforcement who had a spotless
record. He was fired for saying that he could not recall whether he had put his hand on
his side-arm during a search of suspect, or whether he actually removed his weapon and
pointed it at the ground. Assuming for the sake of argument that Officer Lucas
withdrew his weapon and knew that he was pointing it at the ground during the search
of Mr. Spegar, dismissal is excessive and disproportionate.
Murray City follows a policy of progressive discipline. Officer Lucas had not
been warned, reprimanded or suspended for misconduct. Moreover, other officers who
had admitted to acts of dishonesty which were far more egregious have not been fired.
During the pendency of the investigation, the City authorized Officer Lucas to effect
arrests and testify on its behalf in Court proceedings. The termination of employment
under these circumstances constitutes a clear abuse of authority.
248U40608.3
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4.

The Commission Erred in Preventing the Impeachment of
Martin Spegar

Mr. Spegar was arrested and convicted for attempting to steal property from
vehicles. Two weeks after his arrest, Mr. Spegar accused Officer Lucas of excessive
force during a search at the station house. He originally accused Officer Lucas of
pointing a gun directly at his head and threatening to "blow his fucking head off."
During a taped polygraph examination, Mr. Spegar retracted that statement and
admitted that Officer Lucas did not point a gun at his head, and that Mr. Spegar never
feared for his life as he had previously stated. At the hearing, Mr. Spegar claimed
during cross-examination that he did not remember making these admissions to the
polygraph examiner. Officer Lucas* counsel attempted to play the audiotape to impeach
Mr. Spegar's in court statements as well as to corroborate Officer Lucas1 testimony. The
Commission's legal counsel, without an objection being made by the City's legal
counsel, prohibited the playing of the tape on the ground that Mr. Spegar could not lay
the foundation to identify his own voice. Thus, Mr. Spegar's testimony stood without
impeachment.
This evidentiary ruling is contrary to the rules of evidence regarding
impeachment of fact witnesses, and the rules of waiver of objections.
5.

Improper Role of Mr. Ferguson, Legal Advisor for the
Commission

The Commission retained Dennis C. Ferguson as its legal counsel. The record
demonstrates that Mr. Ferguson sat as a fourth Commissioner rather than an advisor.
He asked questions of the witnesses, commented on the evidence, intervened during the
proceedings, and made evidentiary rulings without requestfromthe Commission.
The statutes governing the organization and authority of administrative agencies
were violated when the Commission allowed Mr. Ferguson to act as a "fourth
commissioner." His involvement in the proceedings was material and detrimental to
Officer Lucas.

248U40608.3
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6.

The Commission Erred in Upholding the Termination when
the City Admits that it did not Comply with its own Policies
and Procedures

Lt. Fondaco admitted that Murray City's Rules and Regulations regarding
internal affair investigations were violated on several occasions during the investigation
of Officer Lucas. As a merit employee, Officer Lucas has a legally recognized property
interest to ensure that these procedures are followed. Since the City violated its own
due process procedures, the Commission erred in upholding the termination.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE COMMISSION ERRED WHEN IT PREVENTED OFFICER LUCAS
FROM PRESENTING A THEORY OF RETALIATORY DISCHARGE
A.

The Commission's Order Violates the Utah Rules of Evidence
1.

The Commission Was Bound to Follow the Utah
Rules of Evidence

Generally, an administrative agency is not required to strictly apply the Utah
Rules of Evidence. See Pilcher v. Dept. of Social Services, 663 P.2d 450,453 (Utah
1983). However, an exception to this rule exists if the agency, by its own rules or
promulgations, has adopted the Utah Rules of Evidence or agreed to apply them. Id.
Section 13-10 of the Murray City Civil Service Commission Rules and Regulations
states that the Commission shall follow the Utah Rules of Evidence as near as
"practicable." Thus, unless "impractical" the Commission is bound to abide by the
Utah Rules of Evidence1 and the cases interpreting those rules. See Pilcher. 663 P.2d at
453.

1

The Commission's legal conclusions regarding what types of evidence are admissible
are held to a correctness standard because those are legal determinations. State v. Dunn,
850 P.2d 1201,1222 n.22 (Utah 1993). As a general principal, administrative agencies'
legal conclusions are accorded no deference. E.g. King v. Industrial Comm'n, 850 P.2d
1281 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Deference will be given to the Commission when it applies
a correct legal principal to a set of facts. See Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attv. 818
P.2d 23,26 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)(discussing discretion given to administrative
agencies).
248U40608.3
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On October 4,1996, pursuant to order of the Commission, Officer Lucas
identified his witnesses as well as the basic scope of their testimony. In that list, Officer
Lucas identified Ron Barton, an investigator with the Utah Attorney General's Office.
He also identified Robert Evans, a former police officer of Murray City. These
individuals were going to present evidence that would support Officer Lucas'
contention that Chief Killian and Lt. Fondaco had fired Officer Lucas in retaliation for
his cooperation with the Attorney General's investigation into police corruption and
misconduct. (R.42-45). Murray City filed a motion in limine to prevent Officer Lucas
from mentioning the Attorney General's investigation, or even alluding to the
possibility that he had been terminated in retaliation for participation in that
investigation. (R. 116-19). Officer Lucas proffered the testimony he would present to
support a theory of retaliatory discharge. (R. 142-47).
Although the City's motion did not contain a single citation to legal authority
(R. 116-19), the Commission granted the City's Motion. Officer Lucas appeals from
this decision on the grounds that the order violated the Utah Rules of Evidence, unfairly
prejudiced Officer Lucas from presenting a basic tenant of his case (that he was fired as
an act of retaliation), and lacked factual or legal findings to be sufficient as a matter of
law.
B.

The Evidence was Admissible to Show Motive, Intent and Bias
Utah law and the Utah Rules of Evidence specifically allow for the

admission of evidence of a witness* bias, motive and intent. For example, Utah Code
Ann. § 78-24-1 (1996) states, in relevant part, that:
[I]n every case the credibility of the witness may be
drawn in question, by the manner in which he testifies, by
the character of his testimony, or by evidence affecting
his character for truth, honesty or integrity, or by his
motives, or by contradictory evidence

248U40608.3
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Rule 608(c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence specifically provides that:
Bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be
shown to impeach the witness either by examination of
the witness or by evidence otherwise adduced.
The Supreme Court of Utah has applied these statutes and rules liberally to allow for the
introduction of evidence concerning a witness1 bias, motive or intent. In State v.
Hackford. 737 P.2d 200 (Utah 1987), the Court emphasized the importance of
permitting the cross-examiner wide latitude in exposing a witness1 potential bias. While
such a right is not without limitation, it is permissible for a party to introduce evidence
of bias, prejudice or any other motive. Id. at 203. See also, Ong Int'l. Inc. v. Eleventh
Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447,459 (Utah 1993) (it is well-established that testimony
reflecting on bias of a witness is admissible at trial).
While courts in Utah have not expressly addressed this issue in the context of an
employment case, courts in other states have uniformly held that the employees motive
and intent infiringan employee is directly relevant. See Lihoist v. I & W. Inc., 913
P.2d 262,265 (N.M. App. 1996); Williams v. ABS Enterprises. Inc.. 734 P.2d 854, 856
(Okla. App. 1987), E-Z Motor Boat Trailers, Inc. v. Travellers Indemnity Co., 901, 726
P.2d 439,443 (Wash. 1986).
In this case, Lt. Fondaco conducted many of the witness interviews, evaluated
the evidence, and made a conclusion that Officer Lucas was dishonest. (R. 327-337).
He recommended to Chief Killian that Officer Lucas had to be fired. (R. 337). Lt.
Fondaco's motivation, bias and intent in conducting the investigation, weighing the
evidence, and making his recommendation of termination were directly at issue. It is
Officer Lucas1 contention that Lt. Fondaco was biased against him as a result of Officer
Lucas' complaint to the Attorney General's Office regarding Lt. Fondaco's use of
excessive force. Such evidence was relevant and admissible to the issue of whether the
decision to terminate Officer Lucas1 employment was appropriate and lawful.
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Likewise, the complaint lodged by Officer Lucas to the Utah Attorney General's
Office included an allegation of corruption in obtaining bids for vehicle repairs. The
complaint was lodged against the Murray City Police Department as a whole, but the
key player in the bid rigging scheme was alleged to be Lt. Fondaco. The evidence
proffered by Officer Lucas demonstrates that the Attorney General's Office acceded to
Chief Killian's demands to turn the investigation over to the Murray City Attorney's
Office. The proffer also demonstrates that Chief Killian was very embarrassed about
the investigation. This embarrassment, together with a general feeling of betrayal,
caused Chief Killian to be biased against Officer Lucas. At a minimum, this bias
played a role in how Chief Killian evaluated the charges against Office Lucas, and why
he chose termination over a reprimand or suspension.
Because the evidence concerning the true justification of the City's decision to
fire Officer Lucas goes to the very core of the issue before the Commission, it was
reversible error to disallow the evidence. See State v. Lenaburg. 781 P.2d 432 (Utah
1989) (when possible, court should "strike balance" and admit needed evidence while
excluding only prejudicial testimony); see also. State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187 (Utah
1989) cert denied 485 U.S. 1036 (1988) (finding error on part of judge whom excluded
evidence on ground that the proffered evidence seemed exaggerated or incredible; court
can only disallow evidence on legal basis not factual basis).
C.

The Commission's Ruling Failed to Identify Any Rule or Reason
Which Would Render the Proposed Evidence Inadmissible

The Commission also erred in granting Murray City's Motion in Limine
because it failed to make the appropriate findings of fact or conclusions of law.
Specifically, the order granting the motion made no findings of fact or conclusions of
law regarding the effect of the proffered evidence. The Commission also failed to cite
any rule, case, reason, or theory upon which to exclude such evidence. The
Commission's invasive ruling, without any statement of reason on the record, is an
abuse of discretion and reversible error as a matter of law. See State v. Patterson. 656
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P.2d 438 (Utah 1982). In Patterson, the Utah Supreme Court found "improper" and an
"abuse of discretion" a trial court's decision to exclude evidence on the grounds that it
might confuse or prejudice the trier of fact, or waste time, without making findings on
the record that the proposed evidence would waste time, be confusing, or be prejudicial.
Id. at 439. "An administrative agency must makefindingsof fact and conclusions of
law that are adequately detailed so as to permit meaningful appellate review." LaSal
Oil Co. v. Dept. of Envt'l Quality, 843 P.2d 1045,1047 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Failure
to make suchfindingsof fact renders a decision "arbitrary and capricious" unless the
evidence is clear and uncontroverted on the topic, and there is only one possible
conclusion. Hidden Valley Coal Co. v. Utah Bd. of Oil, 866 P.2d 564, 568 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993).
D.

Rule 403 Does Not Apply to Theories of Defense, But Rather Specific
Pieces of Evidence

The Commission will likely argue that its decision to exclude evidence of bias
or retaliation was based upon Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. As specifically
stated in that rule, its terms only apply to individual pieces of evidence, not affirmative
defenses. See Utah R. Evid. 403. This Court has previously held that due process
requires not only that a party be allowed to present one's evidence at an administrative
hearing, but "one's contentions" as well. Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attv.. 818 P.2d
23, 31 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The Commission's order excluded all evidence and
reference to Officer Lucas1 claim that he was fired for retaliatory purposes.
Consequently, the Commission's order was too broad.
It is unlawful for an employee to be fired in retaliation for reporting misconduct
to the authorities. See Banaitis v. Mitsubishi Bank. Ltd., 879 P.2d 1288 (Or. App.
1994) (employer may not discharge employee for filing claims); D'Angelo v. Gardner.
819 P.2d 206 (Nev. 1991) (employer may not discharge employee for refusing to work
in unsafe environment).
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In this case, Officer Lucas and others reported police misconduct and corruption
to the Utah Attorney General's Office. The Attorney General initiated an investigation
into the affairs of Lt. Fondaco and the Murray City Police Department. The preliminary
investigation revealed elements of a bidriggingscheme associated with vehicular
repairs. The investigation was stopped at the insistence of Chief Killian. Given the
incident in question, the nature of the investigation and the severity of the discipline,
Officer Lucas should have been allowed to present as a theory, regardless of the
evidence weighing in favor or against the theory, that the decision to terminate his
employment was based on retaliatory motives and bias against him. "Ignoring a party's
legal contentions denies the party a fair opportunity to be heard." Tolman. 818 P.2d at
31 (citation omitted). The Commission's order granting Murray City's Motion in Limine
was clear error which warrants that the case be remanded for a new hearing.
II.
THE COMMISSION'S DECISION TO UPHOLD THE TERMINATION
OF OFFICER LUCAS WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT
MATERIAL EVIDENCE
This Court should vacate the Commission's ruling on the grounds that
insufficient evidence was presented to support the City's decision to fire Officer Lucas.
A.

Evidence Supporting The Commission's Decision

The following evidence was presented to the Commission which could, if
construed in a light favorable to the decision, be viewed as supportive of the
Commission's conclusions:
1.

Upon reaching the station house, Officer Lucas unhandcuffed Mr.

Spegar, put his arms against the wall and searched him a second time. (R. 553-4).
2.

Officer Lucas ordered Mr. Spegar to stand and to empty his pockets at

the station house. (R. 557).
3.

Mr. Spegar testified that while emptying his pockets, Officer Lucas, at a

distance of approximately three feet, took out his weapon, pointed it at him,
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"somewhere in [his] direction" and said "if you pull out a gun or whatever, I'll blow
your fucking head off, I promise." (R. 557).
4.

On the evening of this incident, Mr. Spegar was wearing old pants with a

broken fly, but they were not baggy. (R. 558).
5.

Dustin Garcia, who was also arrested that night, testified that he

overheard Officer Lucas threatening Mr. Spegar. (R. 558).
6.

Mr. Garcia was in an enclosed room, but the door was open. The room

was alternatively 20 feet to 20 yards awayfromMr. Spegar and Officer Lucas. (R. 581;
608).
7.

Approximately ten days later, Lt. Rowland received a telephone call

from Gil Garcia telling him about the incident. (R. 589-90). Lt. Rowland testified that
in this telephone conversation he was informed that one of the arresting officers had
pulled a gun on Mr. Spegar. The officer was described as a balding officer. (R. 590).
8.

Each of three individual arrestees involved on the evening in question

was put into a room toward the south end of the station. (R. at 606). One of the
individuals was placed in the "interview room" (Dustin Garcia) while the other two
individuals (Martin Spegar and Michael Hamblin) were placed in the first and second
offices respectively. (R. 606-607).
9.

Officer Snow asked Officer Lucas to "keep an eye" on Mr. Spegar while

he went to speak with Mr. Garcia. (R. at 609).
10.

Having left Officer Lucas with Mr. Spegar, and returningfromhis

conversation with Mr. Garcia, Officer Snow observed Officer Lucas standing in the
doorway of the room with "his side arm out of the holster, pointing at the ground." (R.
610). At this same time, Officer Snow observed Mr. Spegar taking items out of his
pocket and putting them on the desk in the room. (R. 610-11). Officer Snow was
approximately four feet away from Officer Lucas while he made these observations.
(R.611).
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11.

Officer Snow found it somewhat odd that Officer Lucas had his gun to

his side because in his opinion it was not an officer safety issue at the time. (R. 611).
12.

Officer Snow had not felt in jeopardy while he had been speaking with

Mr. Spegar. (R. 612-13).
13.

Officer Snow testified that he did not suspect Mr. Spegar had a weapon

on him at the time. (R. 613).
14.

Lt. Fondaco met with Chief Killian, described the complaint, and told

Chief Killian that Officer Snow had actually witnessed Officer Lucas with his weapon
out of the holster. (R. 682-83). Lt. Fondaco gave Officer Lucas a Garrity warning and
testified that officers employed by Murray City have been trained in what Garrity
means. (R. 683).
15.

Lt. Fondaco testified that Officer Lucas denied in an interview that he

had his weapon out of his holster at the time in question. (R. 687).
16.

Lt. Fondaco interviewed Officer Snow a second time to have him clarify

what he believed took place. (R. 687).
17.

Upon request of the Police Department, Mr. Spegar gave a polygraph

examination. (R. 690).
18.

The Police Department received the results of the polygraph of Marty

Spegar but did not receive a polygraph exam report following the polygraph of Officer
Lucas. Instead, it received a written report from the polygrapher regarding Officer
Lucas' statements. (R. 692).
19.

Lt. Fondaco prepared a summary of the case against Officer Lucas to

present to Chief Killian. The report was introduced as Exhibit No. 12 of the official
exhibits. (R. 692). All items constituting Exhibits 1 through 11, and Exhibit 13 were
utilized in the development of Lt. Fondaco's report. (R. 693-94).
20.

Lt. Fondaco felt he could identify seven discrepancies in Officer Lucas'

statements to him. Those alleged discrepancies are as follows:
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(1)
Officer Lucas indicated to Lt. Fondaco that he was not
present when the arrestees in question were advised of their rights and
written statements takenfromthem. However, Officer Snow testified
that Officer Lucas was around for approximately 45 minutes. Therefore,
he did not immediately leave as his statement indicated. (R. 695-96).
(2)
Officer Lucas stated that his only additional contact
with the arrestees after they were all under control of Officer Snow
was that he had a confrontation with Michael Hamblin. Lt.
Fondaco believed this was not true because Officer Lucas admitted
to "going back in and researching" Mr. Spegar. (R. 696).
(3)
Officer Lucas admitted to searching Mr. Spegar and
claimed that during the search, Mr. Spegar inserted his hands into
his crotch area in what Officer Lucas perceived to be an attempt to
retrieve a weapon. Officer Lucas then indicated that in response he
unsnapped his weapon and said "don't do that," put Mr. Spegar up
against the wall, and searched him, but Officer Lucas denied any
other allegation made by Mr. Spegar. Lt. Fondaco points to this
account as an inconsistency since Officer Snow testified that he
saw Officer Lucas with a weapon out of its holster. (R. 697).
(4)
Lt. Fondaco again repeated that Officer Lucas
denied having his weapon out of its holster but indicates that
Marty Spegar and Officer Snow both state that they saw his
weapon out of the holster. (R. 698).
(5)
Officer Lucas denied threatening to kill Martin
Spegar, while another arrestee, Dustin Garcia, claims to have
overheard it. (R. 699).
(6) &(7) Officer Lucas' statement that he had a grip on his
gun but never pointed it at Martin Spegar, yet Mr. Spegar and
Officer Snow both stated that the weapon was out of Officer
Lucas' holster.
21.

Lt. Fondaco testified that in no part of Officer Lucas' statement did he

recall removing the weaponfromthe holster, whether pointed at the floor or in the
direction of the arrestee. (R. 699-700).
22.

Lt. Fondaco testified, without explaining what they were, that there were

discrepancies in Officer Lucas' pretermination statement to Chief Killian. (R. 700).
23.

Lt. Fondaco concluded that "due to the seriousness of these violations

and the implications created by them, the only recommendation available would have to
be termination." (R. 701). He further testified that Officer Lucas' untruthfulness and
dishonesty violated Murray City Police Department policy and procedure as well as the

248U40608.3

17

morals of the community and placed him in a position where his credibility and
integrity as a police officer would be questioned at every facet of his employment. (R.
701).
24.

Lt. Fondaco testified that he was sure in his belief that Officer Lucas did

not tell the truth in the internal affairs investigation from the point of giving the Garrity
warning. It was his belief that Officer Lucas pointed his weapon at Marty Spegar and
then denied that fact to Lt. Fondaco in the internal affairs investigation. (R. 702).
25.

Lt. Fondaco testified that he believed that any officer could answer

within one week or two weeks after a specific incident whether or not he or she pulled
his or her weapon. (R. 704).
26.

Having received a summary and findings of Lt. Fondaco, Chief Killian

scheduled a pretermination hearing of Officer Lucas. (R. 767). A pretermination
hearing was conducted on August 7,1996. (R. 767).
27.

Subsequent to the pretermination hearing, Chief Killian met with Officer

Snow and discussed the matter. (R. 768).
28.

Chief Killian made a decision to terminate the employment of Officer

Lucas "approximately two weeks after the hearing," or alternatively, on August 14,
1996. (R. 768).
29.

Chief Killian had "problems" with terminating an officer with twelve

years experience and "did not want to have to do something like that." (R. 768-69).
30.

In Chief Killian's opinion, the most important characteristic of a police

officer is honesty. (R. 769).
31.

As of August 21,1996, the date of the Letter of Termination, Chief

Killian had reached a conclusion that he could not trust Officer Lucas. (R. 769).
32.

Officer Lucas testified that at the scene of the arrest of Messrs. Spegar,

Garcia and Hamblin, he did not consider the incident a critical one because he saw no
weapons. (R. 808).
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33.

Officer Lucas testified that at the scene of arrest when the suspects were

fleeing he ordered them to stop or he would "blow their brains out." (R. 808).
34.

Officer Lucas did not prepare a supplemental report after the incident

identifying that he had unsnapped his weapon in the office. (R. 812).
35.

Officer Lucas actually "unsnapped" his weapon twice to the best of his

recollection. (R. 815).
36.

Officer Lucas could not recall whether he had told Lt. Fondaco, Sgt.

Peterson or Chief Killian that he had actually unsnapped his weapon twice. (R. 815).
37.

After talking to Officer Snow, Officer Lucas had doubts about what had

actually happened in the office with Mr. Spegar, but because this was an excessive force
investigation, and not an honesty investigation, he did not seek out Lt. Fondaco to tell
Lt. Fondaco that he did not completely recall all incidents that occurred in the room.
(R. 818).
B.

Evidence Making the Commission's Findings Unreasonable

The following evidence presented to the Commission at the hearing on
November 19,1996, demonstrates that it was unreasonable for the Commission to
conclude that the evidence marshalled above supported a decision to terminate Officer
Lucas.
Marty Spegar
Marty Spegar was the individual who accused Officer Lucas of excessive force
and is the only claimed direct eyewitness of all of the relevant events. The following
evidence directly discredits or contradicts the testimony he gave the Commission:
1.

Mr. Spegar admitted to attempted vehicle burglary, a felony involving

dishonesty. (R. 551).
2.

Mr. Spegar initially accused Officer Lucas of pointing his gun directly at

his head and threatening to kill him. (R. 285-6). However, Mr. Spegar recanted after
he learned he failed to pass the polygraph examination. (R. 557).
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3.

Mr. Spegar identified the gun allegedly pointed at him as being all black.

(R. 571). In fact, Officer Lucas' weapon is chrome with only a black handle. (R. 742).
4.

Although Mr. Spegar claims his life had just been threatened by a police

officer, Mr. Spegar never told any of the other officers or jailers about the incident. (R.
571-74).
5.

Mr. Spegar failed a polygraph exam when interviewed about the event.

He scored a negative three (-3) on the exam. (Exhibit 11; R. 323-26). A score of
positive seven (+7) is required as the lowest score to demonstrate credibility. (Exhibit
11; R. 323-26).
6.

Mr. Spegar admitted to telling the polygraphed Sgt. Peterson, that he

now believes that his life was not threatened by Officer Lucas. (R. 575). He further
stated that he didn't know whether he felt threatened at all. (R. 575-76).
7.

When asked whether he had indicated to the internal affairs investigators

that the gun was pointed to his head during the time he was emptying his pockets, Mr.
Spegar could not answer, indicating that he did not know. (R. 576).
8.

Although Mr. Spegar's life had allegedly just been threatened, he never

mentioned the subject to hisfriendswhile being transported to jail, and in fact told
jokes during the carrideto jail. (R. 630).
9.

Although Mr. Spegar claimed Officer Lucas had threatened to "blow his

fucking brains out" he did not even remember Officer Lucas' name when first
questioned about the incident. (R. 741).
10.

Mr. Spegar gave contradictory statements about whether he had already

emptied his pockets before the alleged gun incident, yet Officer Snow, at a distance of
only four feet, clearly saw that Mr. Spegar did have objects in his pockets that he
emptied upon Officer Lucas' request. (R. 625; 639).
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Dustin Garcia
Dustin Garcia was arrested with Mr. Spegar on the evening in question. He is
the only individual who claims to have overheard Officer Lucas making threats to Mr.
Spegar. However, the following evidence demonstrates that Mr. Garcia's testimony
could not have been the basis of a reasonable decision to fire Officer Lucas:
1.

Dustin Garcia testified that he was in the room right next to Mr. Spegar

and that "through the wall" he heard Officer Lucas threatening hisfriendMr. Spegar.
(R. 580-81, 588). However, the testimony of all of the other witnesses presented by the
City, including Officer Snow and Lt. Rowland, indicated that Dustin Garcia was in fact
the farthest awayfromMr. Spegar, in an interview room which was alternatively 20 feet
to 20 yards awayfromMr. Spegar. (R. at 625).
2.

Michael Hamblin was arrested with Messrs. Garcia and Spegar. He was

in the room adjacent to Mr. Spegar. Mr. Hamblin stated that he did not overhear or see
anything to substantiate Messrs. Spegar and Garcia's allegation. (R. 312).
3.

Although Dustin Garcia claims to have overheard threats by Officer

Lucas while some 20 feet to 20 yards away, Officer Snow testified that if anyone would
have been yelling in the office, "you could have heard itfromone end to the other." (R.
614). Nevertheless, Officer Snow, who was at all times closer than Dustin Garcia, and
at the time of the alleged gun drawing was only 4 feet from Officer Lucas, did not hear
anything to substantiate the allegations of Messrs. Spegar or Garcia. (R. 611, 612-14).
Officer Snow further stated that it would be very hard to overhear someone using a
speaking voicefromMr. Garcia's position. (R. 637)
4.

Although Dustin Garcia claims that he overheard an officer threatening

to kill hisfriend,the first time he mentioned the incident to anyone was in a "casual
conversation" with his parents some 3 or 4 days after the fact. (R. 582).
5.

Mr. Garcia testified that he and Mr. Spegar discussed the matter at length

immediately after the incident. (R. 585). However, Mr. Spegar reported that he didn't
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tell anyone about the event at the time because he didn't originally think Officer Lucas
had done anything wrong. (R. 295-97).
Officer Snow
Officer Snow is a police officer working for the Murray Police Department. He
testified as follows:
1.

When Officer Lucas spoke to Officer Snow about his involvement in the

investigation, Officer Lucas told him to "tell the truth, tell them what happened." (R.
618).
2.

Officer Snow was only 4 feet awayfromOfficer Lucas at the time Mr.

Spegar was emptying his pockets and he saw Officer Lucas with his weapon pointed to
the ground. Officer Snow did not overhear the statements that Mr. Spegar claims
Officer Lucas made, and that Dustin Garcia, some 20 feet to 20 yards away, claims to
have overheard. (R. 625).
3.

Officer Lucas never raised his gunfromthe ground, and never threatened

Mr. Spegar. (R. 625).
4.

Officer Snow testified that he transported Messrs. Spegar and Garcia to

the jail after the incident. (R. 630-31). He indicates that during that time there was no
conversation between the arrestees of the alleged incident but that instead Mr. Spegar
was telling jokes. (R. 630).
5.

Officer Snow corroborated Officer Lucas' testimony that Mr. Spegar had

metal objects in his pockets, and Officer Snow saw Mr. Spegar remove these objects
from his pockets at the same time he saw Officer Lucas with his gun pointed to the
ground. (R. 625; 639).
6.

Officer Snow indicated that he did not believe the incident involving

Officer Lucas' gun being out of its holster was even worthy of being mentioned in his
routine report; accordingly, Officer Snow never made a report of the incident until
requested to do so as part of the internal affairs investigation. (R. 629).
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7.

Officer Snow testified that police officers are trained under the premise

that an individual carrying a "straight-edge" weapon can cover an area of twenty-one
(21) feet before an officer could even react by drawing his or her weapon. (R. 631).
8.

Officer Snow corroborated the statement of Officer Lucas that Officer

Lucas was not present for the mirandizing of Mr. Spegar, even through Lt. Fondaco
listed that statement as an inconsistency by Officer Lucas. (R. 628).
9.

Officer Snow testified that he wasn't concerned at the sight of Officer

Lucas' weapon because Officer Snow knows Officer Lucas to be a senior officer and
just assumed Officer Lucas "had a good reason for doing so." (R. 630).
10.

Officer Snow testified that at the time Mr. Spegar was emptying his

pockets (and at the time Mr. Spegar alleges that Officer Lucas threatened to kill him),
Mr. Spegar's demeanor was calm and unagitated. (R. 641).
11.

Officer Snow testified that if a suspect put his hands in his crotch after

being told to empty his pockets, he too would be concerned for safety. (R. 639).
Dr. Kenneth Rogers
Dr. Rogers is a clinical psychologist who testified on behalf of Officer Lucas.
He was the only expert witness called, and his testimony was uncontradicted by the
City. Dr. Rogers offered the following evidence:
1.

Dr. Rogers has vast experience in the area of employment related post-

traumatic stress. (R. 646).
2.

When an individual is in a critical incident or in a situation perceived as

extremely stressful, the brain will focus on singular aspects of an incident to the
exclusion of other aspects. (R. 648).
3.

The incident causing one person to have this memory exclusion or

"tunnel vision" is subjective rather than objective. (R. 648).
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4.

Dr. Rodgers has had experience dealing with law enforcement officers

faced with flight versus flight situations, and that it is his experience they are not able to
completely perceive all events accurately. (R. 652).
5.

Dr. Rodgers reviewed all the statements of Officer Lucas presented in

the internal affairs investigation, including his interview with Lt. Fondaco, and the
polygraph report. (R. 654).
6.

Dr. Rodgers opined that Officer Lucas' statements were consistent with

an individual experiencing perceptual distortions, and that in his opinion Officer Lucas
was "telling the truth." (R. 655).
7.

Dr. Rodgers testified that Officer Lucas' statements were consistent

"across persons and across time, which lends credence, in [his] opinion, to a person
telling the truth." He found Officer Lucas to be non-defensive in his statements and
willing to accept that another officer perceived something different than himself, and
not challenging that, but sticking with original perception. (R. 655-56).
Lt. Pete Fondaco
Lt. Fondaco is a lieutenant with the Murray City Police Department and the
internal affairs investigator for the incident in question. Lt. Fondaco offered the
following testimony which renders the Commission's findings untenable:
1.

Lt. Fondaco admitted to violating Murray City Policy and Procedure

during the investigation of Officer Lucas, including, but not limited to, the fact that
Officer Lucas was never informed in writing of the initial charge against him, that he
was never informed at any point that the charge against him had changed from
excessive force to dishonesty, and that the investigation was not concluded within 30
days as required by policy. (R. 708-11).
2.

In direct contravention to his report that the only option available to

Chief Killian was termination, Lt. Fondaco testified that he did not ask to have Officer
Lucas put on administrative leave during the pendency of the investigation. Lt.
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Fondaco knew that Officer Lucas would be called upon to make arrests, to testify at trial
and to use his weapon during the pendency of the investigation. (R. 718). Lt Fondaco
was not concerned that Officer Lucas might misuse his weapon because "[Officer
Lucas] is too good an officer for that. No, that would never happen." (R. 718-19).
3.

Lt. Fondaco testified that for more than a month following the allegation,

Officer Lucas continued to represent the Murray City Police Department without
incident or problem. (R. 719-20).
4.

Lt. Fondaco conceded to the following:
(a)

He could not substantiate that Marty Spegar was thrown against the
wall and searched (R. 721);

(b)

He could not substantiate that Officer Lucas made threats to Mr.
Spegar's life (R 721);

(c)

He could did not substantiate the statement that Officer Lucas' gun
was pointed to Mr. Spegar's head or at his head (R. 721);

(d)

He could not substantiate Mr. Spegar's claims that he did not have
any tools in his pockets at the time of the alleged incident; and

(e)

He could not substantiate the claim that Mr. Spegar "did not go for
his crotch" as if reaching for a weapon. (R. 721-22).

5.

Lt. Fondaco admitted that he is aware of other individuals disciplined by

the Police Department for incidents involving dishonesty, yet who were not fired. (R.
760-62).
6.

Lt. Fondaco did not review Mr. Spegar's admissions to the polygraph

examiner. (R. 726)
Chief Killian
Chief Killian is the Chief of Police of the Murray City Police Department.
Chief Killian offered the following relevant testimony:
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1.

Chief Killian admitted that the Police Department follows a policy of

progressive discipline. (R. 769)
2.

Chief Killian testified that in his twelve years with the Police

Department, Officer Lucas had never been warned, reprimanded or suspended for
dishonesty. (R. 770).
3.

Chief Killian admitted that the charge of excessive force originally

brought against Officer Lucas (the denial of which is the alleged dishonesty) is "just
something that was not completely proven." (R. 770-71).
4.

Chief Killian did not review all relevant evidence before he fired Officer

Lucas. (R. 771).
5.

Chief Killian decided to fire Officer Lucas because Officer Lucas did not

admit that he could not remember if he pulled his gun out of his holster. (R. 772-3).
However, the pre-termination transcript demonstrates that Officer Lucas told Chief
Killian at least five times that he did not remember if he removed his gun from the
holster. (R. 367; 368; 371; 373; 374).
C.

The Commission's Findings Should be Overturned

Officer Lucas concedes that this Court should grant deference to the
Commission's findings of fact. Nevertheless, the Commission's findings should be
upheld only if they are "supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the
whole record before the Court." Grace Drilling v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63, 67
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citation omitted) (reviewing case under UAPA). See also.
Stegen v. Dept. of Empl. Sec. 751 P.2d 1160,1163 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (Pre-UAPA)
(appellate court may substitute its interpretation of record for agency's if findings not
supported by substantial evidence). Findings that are "clearly against the logic and
effect of such facts as are presented in support of the application, or against the
reasonable and probable deductions" thereof are an "abuse of discretion." Tolman. 815
P.2d at 26. A review of all evidence presented to the Commission, marshaled in
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favor of the Commission's decision, demonstrates that there was not substantial support
for the finding that Officer Lucas lied during the investigation.
Therefore, this Court should substitute its judgment for that of the Commission
since the Commission's decision is not substantially supported by competent evidence.
Id.; Steeen. 751 P.2d at 1163..
1.

Insufficient Evidence Existed to Sustain the Termination

The evidence, when taken as a whole, demonstrates that Murray City did not
prove that Officer Lucas knowingly lied during the internal affairs investigation. The
following five uncontroverted points render the Commission's decision unreasonable:
1. Officer Lucas' accuser made inconsistent statements
about the alleged events and then recanted part of his
story;
2. The only other corroborator, Dustin Garcia, could not
have overheard the threats he claims to have heard
through the wall because he was down the hall, some
20 feet to 20 yards away;
3. Any failure of Officer Lucas to recall precisely
whether he only placed his hand on his weapon or
actually drew it is normal psychological behavior
under the circumstances;
4. Officer Lucas, who confirmed with another officer
who saw his weapon out, encouraged that officer to tell
the investigators the truth; and
5. Officer Lucas continued to perform his duties,
including testifying in Court, despite the City's belief
that he was a dishonest officer.
These points demonstrate that if any inconsistencies existed in Officer Lucas'
statements, they were not attributable to an intent to deceive. They further demonstrate
that no evidence existed to justify the termination in lieu of a lesser discipline.
III.
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
PUNISHMENT EXCEEDED THE ALLEGED OFFENSE
Murray City is precluded from firing an employee if termination is
disproportionate to the alleged offense. Vetterli v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of Salt Lake
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Citv, 145 P.2d 792 (Utah 1944). The City had the affirmative burden to prove that
Officer Lucas violated Department policy and its discipline was justified under the
circumstances. Salt Lake Citv Corp. v. Louis Jones, et al., 908 P.2d 871 (Utah Ct. App.
1995) (police department's punishment must be consistent and proportionate to the
offense). Officer Lucas maintained that even if the Commission believed he had
violated Police Department policy, the discipline of termination was disproportionate to
the alleged offense.
In order to determine whether the discipline is disproportionate, the trier-of-fact
must examine whether it has been consistently applied in the past. See e.g.. Department
of Human Resource Management Rule 477-11-1 (3)(e). Based on the circumstances as
alleged against Officer Lucas, and the history of similarly accused officers of the
Murray City Police Department, Murray City did not satisfy its burden of justifying
termination.
A.

Murray City Violated its own Policy of Progressive Discipline

Murray City has a policy of progressive discipline. (Section 11-1, Murray City
Civil Service Commission Rules and Regulations; R. at 769). Progressive discipline
exists to ensure that similarly situated public employees are treated in a similar fashion,
and the politics underlying public employment do not become a source of improper or
excessive discipline. Louis Jones, 908 P.2d at 872. Courts have held that when an
officer is disciplined outside of established procedures of progressive discipline, the
discipline must be reversed, and in the case of termination, the officer must be
reinstated. See, e ^ , Anderson v. Citv of Lawton. 748 P.2d 53 (Ok. App. 1987). In that
case, the court reinstated an officer who had been terminated following a violent
domestic dispute which required the intervention of other officers. The terminated
officer was intoxicated and physically violent toward members of his family and
intervening police officers. However, because the city had not imposed a lesser type of
discipline, in a progressive manner, the court reversed the termination. Id. at 55.
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In this case, Officer Lucas has served as an exemplary officer for over twelve
years. He received the highest award of achievement given by the City to a police
officer. There was no evidence presented by the City that Officer Lucas had received
any prior warnings, reprimands or suspensions for misconduct. Consequently, the City
was required to impose some lesser discipline unless the circumstances were so grave as
to warrant termination. Here, there was no credible evidence presented to warrant
termination as the first sanction.
B.

There was no Credible Evidence of Intent to Deceive

The Commission's decision was an abuse of discretion given the uncontroverted
expert testimony of Dr. Kenneth Rodgers, a licensed psychologist. Dr. Rodgers
testified that a person in Officer Lucas' situation (searching a potentially hostile felon)
would likely experience 'tunnel vision" and hence not recall whether he actually pulled
his weapon or only gripped its handle. (R. 648-52, 55). Dr. Rodgers also testified that
when an officer experiences tunnel vision, he subconsciously fills-in the memory
lapses. Thus, even if Officer Lucas1 statements were inconsistent, there was no
evidence that he intended to deceive the City. Dr. Rodgers testified that Officer Lucas'
testimony and statements during the entire investigation were consistent with the
phenomenon of an officer attempting to tell the truth but not recalling every detail of a
hostile scenario. (R. 655). The City did not present any credible evidence to the
contrary.
Moreover, the City's own actions support the conclusion that it did not believe
Officer Lucas was dishonest. Lt. Fondaco admitted that the City did not place Officer
Lucas on administrative leave during the investigation because Officer Lucas was "too
good an officer" to behave improperly. (R. 719-20). He was allowed to carry his
service revolver, effect arrests, and testify in Court proceedings on behalf of the City.
Consequently, even if the City believed Officer Lucas was being less than candid during
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the investigation, its actions demonstrate that it did not believe the conduct was so
egregious as to warrant termination.
IV.
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN PROHIBITING OFFICER LUCAS
FROM PLAYING AN AUDIOTAPE WHEREIN HIS ACCUSER
RECANTED HIS CLAIMS
A defendant can introduce evidence to impeach in court statements of a witness
and to impeach a witness's credibility. Utah R. Evid. 608(c); Utah Code Ann. § 78-241; One Int'l. Inc. v. Eleventh Ave. Corp.. 850 P.2d 447,449 (Utah 1993); State v.
Hackford. 737 P.2d 200 (Utah 1987).
Under cross-examination, Mr. Spegar denied that he recanted his charges of
excessive force to the polygraph examiner. (R. 574). When Officer Lucas1 counsel
attempted to impeach Mr. Spegar by playing a tape wherein Mr. Spegar stated that the
gun was not pointed at his head and his life wasn't threatened, the Commission's legal
adviser stopped him. Mr. Ferguson unilaterally found that there was insufficient
foundation to play the tape. (R. 575). Prior to introducing the audiotape, Officer Lucas1
counsel laid the following foundation:
(1) that Mr. Spegar had taken a polygraph test (R. at 573-4); and
(2) that the polygraph test and Spegar's discussions with the
polygrapher had been tape recorded (R. at 574).
Nevertheless, when counsel attempted to have Mr. Spegar identify his own
voice on the audiotape, the following discussion took place on the record:
Mr. Benevento to Spegar:
Do you know if it [the polygraph] was tape recorded?
Q
A

The polygraph?

Q

Yeah.

A

I'm pretty sure it was.
Have you had a chance to review that tape with the City
Attorney's Office?
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A:

No, I haven't.

Mr. Benevento: If I may, I have a copy of the tape here. Fd like to play
just a portion to impeach.
Mr. Ferguson (legal advisor to the Commission): Not without some
authenticity.
Mr. Benevento: Can I at least play it and [see] if it's his voice?
Mr. Hall: No, I'll object.
Mr. Ferguson: I think you've got to have the right witness here to lay
the foundation. (R. 574-5).
The decision by the Commission (or that is, Mr. Ferguson) to disallow the tape
recording was erroneous. The Utah Rules of Evidence allow a witness to lay the
foundation to authenticate a recording of his or her own voice. Moreover, no objection
was made by opposing counsel prior to Mr. Ferguson's intervention, so any objection
should have been waived.
A.

A Witness May Authenticate His Own Recorded Voice

The ruling preventing introduction of the tape was based solely on foundation.
(R. at 574). Utah law regarding foundation clearly establishes that a fact witness
whose voice is recorded can authenticate and lay foundation for the recording. Rule
1007 of the Utah Rules of Evidence specifically states:
Contents of... recordings.. .may be proved by the
testimony or deposition of the party against whom offered,
or by the party's written admission, without accounting
for the non production of the original.
Therefore, Mr. Ferguson's decision to prohibit the playing of the tape, even for the
purpose of having Mr. Spegar identify his own voice, was clear error. State v. Moore,
788 P.2d 525 (Utah Ct. App.) cert, denied. 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990) (tape recording
of prior statement of defendant admissible). The error was harmful to Officer Lucas'
case because he was prevented from having the Commissioners hear Marty Spegar
recant part of his story. It was also prejudicial because the Commissioners were not
allowed to assess Mr. Spegarfs demeanor and credibility while being impeached.
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Finally, it was prejudicial because Officer Lucas1 counsel could not follow-up on a line
of questioning which bore on the most critical aspect of the case, namely whether
Officer Lucas drew his weapon.
B.

Murray City Waived Any Objection

The City did not object to the playing of the tape prior to Mr. Ferguson's
intervention. (R. at 574). Moreover, no Commissioner individually questioned the
matter. (R. at 574). Utah law is well settled that failure by opposing counsel to raise an
evidentiary objection waives any future argument regarding the admissibility of the
evidence. Utah R. Evid. 103. The law is equally settled that a blanket objection is
insufficient, but that a specific and timely objection must be made. E.g. State v.
Schreuden 726 P.2d 1215 (Utah 1986) (to preserve argument, objection must be clear,
specific and timely). Therefore, the City waived any objection to playing the tape for
the purpose of impeaching Mr. Spegar's testimony.
V.
THE COMMISSION EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY IN ALLOWING ITS
LEGAL ADVISOR TO PARTICIPATE AS A COMMISSIONER
The scope of authority given to administrative agencies is limited. The Utah
Constitution delegates all power to charter such agencies to the State Legislature. Utah
Const. Art. XI, Sec.5. The Legislature has narrowly tailored the organization and
authority of agencies. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1001 to -06. The Utah Supreme Court
has held that whenever a question arises as to whether an administrative agency has the
authority to act in a manner not expressly provided by statute, courts must error toward
restricting the agency's authority rather than allowing unpermitted acts to occur.
Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 754 P.2d 41 (Utah 1988). Courts reviewing actions
of commissions "should be bound by the principle" that when a "specific power is
conferred by statute upon a . . . commission with limited powers, [its] powers are
limited to such as are specifically mentioned." Union Pac. R.R. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 134 P.2d 469,474 (Utah 1943) (emphasis added). "To ensure that the
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administrative powers of the [Commission] are not overextended, 'any reasonable doubt
of the existence of any power must be resolved against the existence thereof.'"
Williams. 754 P.2d at 50. Furthermore, the Utah Code requires a civil service
commission to create and presumably follow its own rules and regulations. See Utah
Code Ann. §10-3-1006.
In this case, the Commission's rules and regulations do not provide for the use of
outside legal counsel at all, let alone allow such an adviser to fully participate in the
fact-finding process with the Commissioners. Murray City Civil Service Commission
Rules and Regulations § 3-4. (outlining power of Commission).
The Commission retained Dennis Ferguson to act as its legal counsel. Mr.
Ferguson was allowed by the Commission to actively participate in the proceedings.
The record is replete with instances where Mr. Ferguson asked questions of witnesses,
made legal rulings without request by any Commissioner, commented on evidence,
made interpretations of evidence on the record, made evidentiary rulings without
objectionfromcounsel, and so forth. These acts go beyond what is reasonable of an
"advisor." In fact, a review of the record demonstrates that he spoke on the record more
than all Commissioners combined. (See, e.g.. R. 532; 536; 539-40; 570; 575; 589; 600;
602; 711-13; 623; 632-35; 662; 674-5; 723; 732; 734-6; 751; 755; 757-9; 828-9). Mr.
Ferguson actually conducted extensive factual interrogation of witnesses such as Dr.
Rodgers, Officer Snow, and even the Petitioner, Officer Lucas. (R. at 611-13; 632-6;
674-5; 823-26). Following counsel's objection to Mr. Ferguson's active involvement,
Mr. Ferguson responded as follows: "It is my role, as I perceive it, to make sure that
the facts related to the case are brought forward so that they [the Commissioners] can
make a decision." (R. 678).
Mr. Ferguson's self-perceived role is incorrect. It is not the role of a "legal"
advisor to determine which facts do or do not need to be brought to the attention of the
Commission. The Commissioners are the only proper finders of fact. Mr. Ferguson's
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practice had the effect of emphasizing for the Commission whatever evidence Mr.
Ferguson thought important and highlighting the witnesses Mr. Ferguson thought most
pertinent. For instance, during Mr. Ferguson's interrogation of Officer Lucas regarding
the propriety of re-searching Mr. Spegar, the following dialogue takes place:
MR. FERGUSON:

Did you pat down his crotch area at that

THE WITNESS:

I did not.

MR. FERGUSON:

Why not?

time?

THE WITNESS:
I've got two men in custody, you know.
And if I were to do that, then I'd have to give my undivided attention to
this guy. If he clamped down on Ids legs, my hand's trapped and the
other one turns around, they can beat the crap out of me.
MR. FERGUSON:
handcuffed.

I think you said you'd got them both

THE WITNESS:

That's right.

MR. FERGUSON:

Why didn't you pat them down?

THE WITNESS:
As I said, it's the methods that we're
taught. You know, just because someone is handcuffed doesn't mean
that they can't hurt you. It's an officer safety thing.
MR. FERGUSON: I'm concerned here. I don't mean to cut
you off, but you said you reached into his pocket and grabbed onto
something that was a hard object. Why is that different than patting
down the crotch? (R. 823-24).
This line of questioning demonstrates that Mr. Ferguson actually crossexamined Officer Lucas on issues Mr. Ferguson apparently disbelieved or found
bewildering. In fact, Mr. Ferguson flatly offered his opinion of Officer Lucas'
explanation on the record:
MR. FERGUSON: What's confusing to me as a layperson is
why, if you thought he had a weapon, why you would let him put his
hands anywhere near where the weapon might be, if you already had
the opportunity with him being handcuffed to make sure he didn't have
a weapon. (R. 824).
Moreover, Mr. Ferguson's practice of ruling on evidentiary issues before an
objection had been made, and without request of any Commissioner, demonstrates that
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Mr. Ferguson was allowed to make sua sponte decisions without consulting the
Commissioners. (See e.g. R. 575). Such participation is not consistent with the role of
an "advisor" but demonstrates that Mr. Ferguson had nearly limitless power to influence
the hearing. His participation was not consistent with the stringent limitation of
commission powers, and the selection and qualification of commissioners, as outlined
under the law. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1001 to -06. Thus, as recognized in Williams,
this Court should rule that such acts violate the limited authority granted to the
Commission and order a new hearing to be conducted in conformity to statutory
guidelines. See also, Utah Gas Service Co. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 422 P.2d 530
(Utah 1967) (party to administrative hearing entitled to full and fair hearing conducted
in conformity with law).
VI.
THE COMMISSION ERRED BY AFFIRMING THE DISCHARGE
OF OFFICER LUCAS DESPITE THE CITY'S FAILURE
TO COMPLY WITH ITS RULES
An officer has a property interest in continued employment unless the person is
afforded due process through established guidelines to terminate that employment.
Worrall v. Qgden City Fire Dept. 616 P.2d 598, 601 (Utah 1980). Thus, an officer has
an interest in the procedural protections codified by a municipality to prevent unjust
termination. See id. at 602.
The uncontroverted facts demonstrated that the City violated its own written
policies during its investigation of Officer Lucas. (R. at 707-17). These violations
obligated the Commission to set aside the discipline. "In an analysis of a procedure, an
important factor is the risk of an erroneous deprivation of a private interest through the
procedures, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute safeguards."
Worrall 616 P.2d at 602. Because the City admittedly did not provide Officer Lucas
with the procedures implemented to ensure fair treatment in disciplinary proceedings,
this Court must reverse the Commission's decision and order that Officer Lucas be
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reinstated. See also, Anderson, 748 P.2d at 55 (ordering reinstatement of fired officer
for failing to follow department procedures).
During cross-examination, Lt. Fondaco admitted to the following:
(1)

The internal affairs investigation of Officer Lucas lasted more
than 30 days and that Murray City Policy and Procedure requires
such investigations to be completed within 30 days (R. 707-9);

(2)

Officer Lucas was never informed at any time that the internal
affairs investigation against him had been changed from one of
excessive force to one of dishonesty (R. 710);

(3)

Officer Lucas had not been provided with a written statement of
the charges against him before he was interrogated by Lt.
Fondaco (R. 709-10);

(4)

The failure to notify Officer Lucas of the original charge against
him (excessive force) and that the investigation had changed to
one of dishonesty were both violations of City policy (R. 71013); and

(5)

Lt. Fondaco never contacted the Utah Attorney General's Office
or any other investigative authority regarding the internal affairs
investigation of excessive force as indicated by City policy (R.
716-17).

The Murray City Police Department has adopted Policy 555, III which contains
the following relevant language:
(E)

Internal Affairs investigations will be completed within thirty
(30) days with status reporting done every seven (7) days.
Extensions will be authorized by the Chief of Police in those
cases where extenuating circumstances exist.
****

(G)

Prior to any interview of an accused member as part of an
Internal Affairs Investigation, the member will be given written
notification of the allegations, and their rights and responsibilities
relative to the investigation.

The uncontroverted evidence presented to the Commission demonstrated that
the City violated its own policies. However, the Commission's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law do not even address these procedural errors. This is an abuse of
discretion which warrants reversal of the Commission's decision, and immediate
reinstatement of Officer Lucas with full back pay. The failure by the Commission to
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even address the issue raised by Officer Lucas is "an abuse of discretion" since "at a
minimum, the [Commission] should have addressed [Lucas'] legal contentions in its
findings and conclusions." Tolman, 818 P.2d at 31-2. As a result, Officer Lucas was
denied the due process ofafiill and fair hearing. Id. Thus, upholding the termination of
Officer Lucas' employment in light of these procedural deficiencies was an abuse of
discretion, and failing to even mention the errors or their effect in itsfindingswas a
further abuse of discretion. Either deficiency alone warrants reversal; together reversal
is mandated.
CONCLUSION
The Commission's decision to uphold Murray City's termination of
Officer Lucas' employment must be set aside. First and foremost, this Court should
substitute its own interpretation of the evidence since the Commission's decision could
not reasonably have been based on the evidence and lacked substantial support. Thus,
the Court should order Murray City to reinstate Officer Lucas with back pay. The Court
should also order the City to reinstate Officer Lucas with back pay since the City
admittedly did not follow its own policies in terminating his employment.
Alternatively, the Court should remand the case back to the Commission
and order a new hearing based upon the Commission's erroneous rulings which
prevented Officer Lucas from: (a) presenting evidence that he was terminated in
retaliation for participating in an Attorney General's investigation of Lt. Fondaco and
the Murray City Police Department; (b) examining the bias of witnesses against him;
and (c) introducing a tape recording of his accuser's partial retraction of his story.
Finally, the Court should remand the case for a new hearing due to the Commission's
decision to allow its "legal advisor" to interrogate witnesses, make sua sponte rulings,
and offer fact opinions on the record.

248U40608.3

37

us
DATED this

II

day of March, 1997
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL
& MCCARTHY

By.
B^yon J. Bendvento
D. Matthew Moscon
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
Attorneys for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused two true and correct copies of the within
and foregoing Brief of Officer Lucas to be hand-delivered, this
to the following:
Craig Hall, Esq.
Murray City Attorney's Office
5025 South State Street
Murray City, Utah 84157-0520
Dennis C. Ferguson, Esq.
WILLIAMS & HUNT
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Bryon J. Benevento (5254)
D. Matthew Moscon (6947)
Attorneys for Grievant
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
MURRAY CITY, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
In the Matter of Officer
EDWARD J. LUCAS,

PROFFER OF TESTIMONY

Grievant,

The grievant, Edward J. Lucas ("Officer Lucas"),
hereby proffers the following testimony of witnesses he may
call to testify regarding his claim of retaliatory discharge.
This proffer is being made in accordance with the Commission's
oral order of October 14, 1996.
ROBERT EVANS
Robert Evans was employed with the Murray City Police
Department from 1985 to 1994.

He is currently employed as a

district agent with the Adult Probation and Parole Office for
the Department of Corrections, State of Utah.

IU

Mr. Evans will testify that Lt. Fondaco would
routinely direct police officers to obtain vehicle repair
quotes from various auto repair shops and then present those
bids to AFC Auto Body Shop.

The owner, Larry Cvitkovich, would

then underbid the other quotes.

Mr. Evans will testify that he

and Officer Lucas informed Ron Barton, an investigator with the
Attorney General's Office, about this bid rigging scheme.

They

also told Mr. Barton that Lt. Fondaco would frequently use
excessive force against arrestees.
Mr. Evans will testify that Ron Barton captured this
bid rigging scheme on videotape and characterized it as a
"heinous anti-trust violation."
Mr. Evans will testify that Chief Kenneth Killian
pressured the Attorney General's Office to cease its
investigation, and insisted that he be given the names of the
officers who made the complaints.
Mr. Evans was called by Randy Richins and told that
Chief Killian recently found out that Mr. Evans and Officer
Lucas were the individuals who reported the police corruption
and misconduct to the Attorney General's Office.

Mr. Evans was

advised to "look out" and to "watch his back" because reprisals
would be forthcoming.

2
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RON BARTON
Ron Barton is an investigator with the Utah Attorney
General's Office.

In 1993 and 1994, Mr. Barton was assigned to

investigate complaints of anti-trust violations.

He received a

complaint from Officer Lucas, Robert Evans and other police
officers of the Murray City Police Department regarding police
corruption and misconduct.
Mr. Barton will testify that Officer Lucas complained
of Lt. Fondaco's use of excessive force and a bid rigging
scheme.

He will testify that the bidding scheme involved Lt.

Fondaco instructing officers of the Murray City Police
Department to take their vehicles to AFC Auto Body Shop for
repair.

The owner of AFC Auto Body Shop, Larry Cvitkovich,

would examine the bids from other auto body shops and then
underbid those quotes.
Mr. Barton will testify that he was about to
investigate whether Lt. Fondaco was receiving any "kick-backs"
when his supervisor told him to stop his investigation.

Chief

Kenneth Killian was infuriated with Mr. Barton's investigation
and demanded that the entire matter be turned over to the
Murray City Attorney's Office.

Chief Killian also demanded to

know the names of the officers who had complained.

Chief

Killian stated that he felt betrayed by these officers and was
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The two o f f i c e r s have asked t h a t t h e i r i d e n t i t i e s be kept c o n f i d e n t i a l
because they are s t i l l employed with the Murray City Police Department and are
concerned about r e t a l i a t i o n . If the Commission r e q u i r e s the o f f i c e r s t o come
forward, Officer Lucas r e q u e s t s t h a t the proceedings be closed, the t r a n s c r i p t
sealed, anyone employed with the Police Department be excluded during t h e i r
testimony, the Murray City A t t o r n e y ' s Office be ordered t o keep the o f f i c e r s '
4
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him that the Police Department "finally discovered" that Robert
Evans and Edward Lucas were the ones w h o complained " o the Utah
Attorney General' s Office aboi it 1:1 i€ g : ] i ::
misconduct.
Fvar.-

M r . Richins will testify that he called M e s s r s .

•-. -'' Lucas to inform them of the disclosure, and to warn

them L ^ expect reprisals.
OFFICERS JOHN DOES
Off±cers J^hn Does are employed with *"he Murray Cit
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Department ot Corrections.
Officers John Does will testify that they are
extreme] y concerned of retaliation f^-on the D o l i c e Department
:i f theii iae;, -, ties are Giscuvii.^'i, ^ ^
Fondaco and Cnief Killian have signed affidavits that they were

identities strictly confidential, and that the logistics of the officers'
testimony be handled in such a way that their identities are not discovered
(e.g., the officers should not be summoned to testify at the Murray City Hall
where everyone knows them).
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copy of the wiIhin and foregoing PROFFER OF TESTIMONY to
hand-delivered this

£'

day of October, 1996,

H. Craig Hall, Esq.
Murray City Attorney
5025 South State Street
Murray, Utah 84107
Dennis C. Ferguson, Esq
WILLIAMS & HUNT
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84
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MURRAY CITY CORPORATION

ORDER GRANTING
MOTION IN LIMINE
EDWARD J. LUCAS

CAMF Ofl TO flF I III
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14th day of October, 1996. The Commission having read and considered Murray City's
r
Memorandum in Opposition to Murray City's Motion in Limine, Officer Lucas' Proffer of
Testimony, and Murray city's Response to p ro ffer ot I estimony along with the Affidavit
of Ronald Barton, and having heard argument of counsel for Murray City and for Officer
Lucas, it is hereb; f:
ORDERS
that it is
CHI III HI II II II i II II i ill Irdw.nd J II J J i i'u In J a I lull! I1 j ,

.JIHI
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witnesses called by Edward J. Lucas are instructed to refrain from mentioning or
referring to, in any way, the following matters during the Civil Service Commission
Hearing:
(a)

any 1993-1994 complaints or allegations Edward J. Lucas and/or others

may have made to the I Jtah Attorn*

potential

corruption in the Murray City Police Department;
(b)

ai ry I

ters

may have mad<

le Utah Attorney General.

antitrust violations involving vehicle repairs in the Murray City Police Department;
• -)

any 1993-1994 complaints or allegations Edward J. Lucas and/or others

iruv I1 "'" '" "'" In Hie I Hah Attornpv General's office against Lieutenant Pete Fondaco;
the 1993-1994 Utah Attorney General's office investigation into the
Murray
(e)

1
any allegation that the decision to terminate the employment of Officer

Lucas was retaliatory in nature.

Signed this the J^^clay of

/t7^t^i^n ^

1996.

MURRAY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
,/

Rex Vance, Chairman
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CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS

IN THE MATTER OF
EDWARD J. LUCAS

On November 19, 1996 commencing at 9:00 a.m., an evidentiary
hearing was held before the Murray City Civil Service Commission
at the Murray City Council Chambers, 5025 South State Street,
Murray, Utah.

Petitioner Edward J. Lucas was present and

represented by his legal counsel, Bryon J. Benevento and D.
Matthew Moscon of Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy; present
and representing Murray City were H. Craig Hall, Murray City
Attorney, and co-counsel Cindy L. Tooms and Kenneth Killian,
Murray City Chief of Police.

Also present throughout the hearing

were the members of the Murray City Civil Service Commission, Rex
Vance (Chairman), Marvin Harding, Ron Smith and Dale Whittle
(Civil Service Secretary) and Dennis C. Ferguson, legal counsel
for the Commission.
Prior to presentation of evidence, the Commission had before
it a Motion filed by Murray City to disqualify Dr. Kenneth
Rodgers, a psychologist whom petitioner intended to call as an
expert witness.

After due consideration of the parties'

memoranda and oral argument, Murray City's Motion was denied.

2/
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Petitioner had also filed a Motion to disqualify Dr. Eric
Nielsen, a psychologist, from testifying as an expert witness on
behalf of Murray City.

Murray City elected not to call Dr.

Nielsen so petitioner's motion to disqualify him became moot.
The parties stipulated that Exhibits 1 through 11 and 13
through 22 could be received.
without objection.

Exhibit 12 was later received

The Commission heard live testimony from

Marty Spegar, Dustin Garcia, Officer Chris Snow, Lieutenant Pete
Fondaco, Police Chief Ken Killian, Dr. Kenneth Rodgers and
petitioner Ed Lucas.
WHEREFORE, having heard and considered the evidence and
argument presented and being fully advised, Murray City Civil
Service Commission hereby makes the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On or about June 10, 1996 Lieutenant Dee Rowland of the

Murray City Police Department, received by telephone a complaint
from Lieutenant Bill Garcia of the Utah Department of Public
Safety, whose son Dustin Garcia had been arrested for automobile
burglary along with Martin Spegar on or about May 27, 1996
(Exhibit 1 ) . Subsequently, a written statement from Marty Spegar
(Exhibit 2) was forwarded to the Murray City Police Department
and the allegation of excessive force against Office Ed Lucas was
assigned to Lieutenant Pete Fondaco for investigation.

- 2 -
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2.

The gist of Mr. Spegar's allegation against Officer

Lucas was that he had unnecessarily removed his service revolver
from his holster during a search of Mr. Spegar that occurred at
the Murray City Police Department and that Officer Lucas had
pointed the revolver at Mr. Spegar and threatened him.
3.

Officer Lucas was questioned by Lieutenant Fondaco

about the incident on June 12, 1996.

At that time, Lieutenant

Fondaco read the written statement of Marty Spegar to Officer
Lucas and asked him whether any of the allegations were true.
Officer Lucas replied that Mr. Spegar placed his hand in his
crotch area and Officer Lucas responded by unsnapping his gun,
putting Spegar up against the wall and searching him.

Officer

Lucas unequivocally denied ever pulling his gun from his holster
and denied pointing the weapon at Mr. Spegar's head.
4.

Subsequent to Lieutenant Fondaco's interview with

Officer Lucas, Officer Chris Snow came forward with information
that he had observed Officer Lucas standing by Spegar's side with
his service revolver drawn and at the "low ready" position.
5.

Officer Lucas testified that he had conducted a pat

down search of Martin Spegar at the time he apprehended him at
the scene.

This search included a pat down of Mr. Spegar's

crotch area; no weapon was discovered or suspected at that time.
Officer Lucas did feel a "hard object" inside of Mr. Spegar's
pants pocket and admits that he attempted to remove this object,
- 3 -
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but it appeared to cause Mr. Spegar some pain, so Officer Lucas
abandoned his efforts to remove it at that time.

Mr. Spegar

testified that this object (a pair of pliers) together with a
small flashlight and his keys were removed at the scene and
replaced back into his pockets.
6.

During a subsequent interview with Polygrapher Vern

Peterson and subsequent to Officer Lucas learning of Officer
Snow's testimony, Officer Lucas described the incident as
follows:
They (Spegar's pants) were loose enough
where he could get both his hands into it
(the crotch area), and even go on from there
obviously. So I stepped back, had one had HAMp
up, unsnapped my weapon and was leaning
forward pushing him aside. My gun was
unsnapped, my hand was on it, and it was
obviously two or three inches outside the
leather. It was pointed down, and I told him
get your God-damned hands out of your pants.
7.

At the hearing, Officer Lucas testified that he did not

unholster his weapon, but that he unsnapped it twice.
8.

Officer Lucas defends his conduct by claiming that his

statements have been consistent.

Alternatively, he claims that

he was under stress and in fear of bodily injury, experienced
tunnel vision, and if he did draw his gun, he can't remember.
9.

The Commission finds that Officer Lucas' statements

regarding the holstering and unholstering of his weapon to be
inconsistent and not credible.

Officer Lucas has alternatively

- 4 -

testified that he thought Spegar may have had sharp objects in
his pocket, such as drug paraphernalia and/or that he had a
weapon in his crotch area.

The Commission does not find this

testimony credible given the testimony of Officer Snow that none
of the suspects appeared to be under the influence of drugs or
alcohol, and that Spegar had been, at all times, cooperative
during the course of the apprehension and interrogation and had
made no threatening gestures.

Officer Lucas also had ample

opportunity to satisfy himself that the suspect did not have a
weapon.

The Commission does not find credible Officer Lucas7

testimony that he cannot remember whether his weapon was
holstered or unholstered.

Indeed, he testified in great detail

about his recollection of the weapon and did not indicate during
the course of his testimony that he could not remember what
occurred in the interrogation room.

Additionally, Officer Lucas

testified that when he apprehended Spegar at the scene of the
crime and was concerned that Spegar might have a weapon, he drew
down and yelled at him words to the effect that he would "blow
his brains out" if he didn't stop.

Thus, it would have been

perfectly believable had Officer Lucas in the station room
believed that Spegar was going for a weapon to have done the same
thing.

Clearly, Officer Lucas' statements regarding what

occurred in the interrogation room and the details of the
incident offered by Officer Lucas changed substantially in
- 5 -

subsequent interviews from the statement initially given to
Lieutenant Fondaco.

Under these circumstances, the Commission

finds that Chief Killian was reasonable in interpreting Officer
Lucas7 statements as inconsistent and untruthful.

Finally, the

Commission finds that whether Officer Lucas' service weapon was
holstered or unholstered is not a trivial matter as urged by
Officer Lucas and his counsel.

Murray City has every right to

expect that its officers will know whether their weapons have
been unholstered and to expect honest reporting of such
incidents.
Based upon these Findings of Fact, the Commission enters the
following
CONCLUSIONS
1.

The Murray City Police Department was justified in

investigating a citizen report of excessive force.
2.

During the course of the excessive force investigation,

Lieutenant Fondaco reasonably suspected that Officer Lucas had
been less than candid with him in providing facts relating to his
conduct in the interrogation room with Mr. Spegar.
3.

Subsequent statements by Officer lucas were

inconsistent and Lieutenant Fondaco and Chief Killian were
justified in concluding that Officer Lucas had been untruthful.
4.

Trust and honesty are essential to the good order and

discipline of a police force.
- 6 -

5.

While discharge, under the circumstances of this case,

is a harsh punishment, the Police Chief must have complete
confidence in the honesty and integrity of his officers and the
Commission finds that it is not an abuse of his discretionary
powers to have terminated Officer Lucas' employment for reasons
of dishonesty.
DATED this ^ " 7

day of November, 1996.
MURRAY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

-^

s

Rex Vance, Chairman

'JMMVIJ $aM/jU*d*iA4
Marvin Hardinc

./£-&&.

Ron Smith
Approved as to form:

e L. Whittle, Secretary

LIMA. v_

Dennis C. Fergusoh, iJegal Advisor

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION

RULING

IN THE MATTER OF
EDWARD J. LUCAS

Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions entered by
the Murray City Civil Service Commission, the appeal of Officer
Ed Lucas is hereby denied and the disciplinary action imposed by
Kenneth Killian, Murray City Police Chief, is hereby affirmed.
DATED this "2 •? day of November, 1996.
MURRAY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Rex Vance, Chairman

Marvin Harding /

Ron Smith

\
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was hand-delivered and served by
facsimile/mail respectively the 2nd of December, 1996 to the following:

H. Craig Hall
Murray City Corporation
5025 South State
Murray Utah 84157

Police Chief Kenneth Killian
Murray City Corporation
5025 South Stae
Murray Utah 84157

Bryon J. Benevento
D. Matthew Moscon
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144-0450

Edward J. Lucas
3290 East Emigration Canyon
Salt Lake city, Utah 84108
Dale L. Whittle
Secretary
Murray City Civil Service Commission
December 2, 1996
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MURRAY CITY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

RULES AND REGULATIONS
(Revised Edition)
Adopted pursuant to Section 10-3-1006 Utah Code Annotated
19 53, as amended

COMMISSIONERS
REX VANCE
RON SMITH
MARVIN HARDING

July 1, 1996

Section 3
COMMISSION
3-1. Organization -- Quorum. The Civil Service Commission shall
consist of three members appointed by the Mayor with the advice
and consent of the Municipal Council. One of the three shall be
designated chairperson, who shall preside at all meetings of the
Commission. For the purpose of the transaction of business, two
members shall constitute a quorum. Each member shall be appointed
to a term of six years, such terms expiring on the 3 0th day of
June of an even-numbered year. One member's term shall expire
each even-numbered year.
3-2. Meetings. The Commission shall meet from time to time at
the place designated on the call of the Secretary at the direction
of the Chairperson or any two members of the Commission. Such
meetings will be scheduled and agendas posted in accordance with
Section 52-4-1, et seq., Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
3-3. Secretary to the Commission. An individual shall be
appointed to serve as secretary to the Commission. It shall be
the duty of the secretary to keep a minute book containing minutes
of all meetings of the Commission. The minutes, after approval,
shall be public records.
3-4. Powers and Duties. The Commission or the Commission
Secretary shall have prime responsibility for:
a. Reviewing appointments and proposed new positions to assure
compliance with established civil service rules and
regulations.
b. Preparing examinations and establishing registers of
eligible candidates for civil service positions.
c. Certifying names from established civil service registers
in compliance with the civil service rules and regulations
to the appointive power or department head.
d. Recommending needed policy changes for the approval of the
Mayor.
e. Maintaining central civil service records.
f. Serving as an Appeals Board for civil service employees
who appeal action taken by the appointive power and/or
Mayor.
3-5. Citizens Complaints. Any citizen may make complaint in
writing to the department head of any violation of duty by any
employee in the civil service, whereupon the department head
may in his/her discretion, investigate such complaint and take
such action as he/she deems necessary. Complaints which cannot
be satisfied in this manner may be submitted to the Mayor for
appropriate action and, if not then satisfied, the citizen may
appeal to the Commission. The Commission may, in its
discretion, investigate such complaint and may require such
citizen to appear in person at a hearing to be conducted by it
of the person accused. Upon such hearing the Commission shall
determine whether the charges in such complaint have been
sustained, and may recommend to the Mayor such punishment by
discharge, suspension, or otherwise, as in its judgment may be
deemed proper under the circumstances.
- 15 -

Section 11
DISCIPLINARY RESPONSIBILITY, GROUNDS AND ORDER
11-1. Responsibility for Discipline. Basic responsibility for
discipline is vested in the appointing power of each department
and not in either the Civil Service Commission or the Mayor.
Progressive discipline which normally involves a verbal reprimand,
written reprimand, suspension and termination shall be
administered fairly and consistently by the appointing power.
Severity of the offense will determine the steps required for
progressive discipline. In cases where the appointing power does
not assume responsibility for exercise of this power the
Commission, in the public interest, may investigate and recommend
appropriate action, and the Mayor may remove the appointing power
as he deems necessary.
11-2. Uniform Penalties. In making demotions or removals, or
imposing penalties for delinquency or misconduct, penalties like
in character shall be imposed for like offenses.
11-3. Misconduct. The following misconduct may be grounds for
suspension or other disciplinary action:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.

1.
m.
n.
o.

Chargeable accident.
Using profane or blasphemous language.
Displaying bad or ungovernable temper.
Lack of promptness in execution of duties.
Neglect of duty or absence from Post of Duty without leave
from proper authority
Uncivil or discourteous attitude toward citizens or
superior officers.
Lounging or idling on duty.
Tardiness (excessive and unexcused).
Lack of unexcused and excessive neatness in person or
dress, reasonably compatible with position held.
The commitment of any crime relating to public morals and
decency, or drunkenness, or violation of the liquor laws,
or other laws involving moral turpitude .
Violation of any City ordinance or State statute, whether
or not a formal criminal charge is filed, or of the
adopted rules and regulations of the Civil Service
Commission or of the department wherein employed, relating
to the conduct and authority of the employees.
Untruthfulness or dishonesty.
Failure to observe applicable administrative rules.
Misuse of city property or equipment.
Using or uttering disrespectful language about or
concerning a fellow officer or employee. Making derogatory
remarks about other members of his department either to
members of his department or to anyone outside of the
department, provided he may do so to his superior, the

- 35 -

13-6. Extension of Time, Amendments and Subpoenas. For good
cause shown upon written petition duly filed and served on the
adverse party or on its own motion, the commission may make s_.cn
orders as it deems necessary, extending the time limit by these
rules within which any party shall be required to act, except for
time within which to appeal, and may require or permit amendments
to pleadings, require and provide for bills of particular, the
taking of depositions, the preservation of evidence, the subpoenaing of witnesses and such other matters or things it deems
necessary and in the best interest of the parties, the public, and
for the full hearing and determination of the matter.
13-7. Default of the Parties. Upon the failure of either party
to appear and defend or prosecute the action, the Commission may
make its own investigation and determination of the matter and
enter its orders in accordance therewith.
13-8. Service on Counsel. Where parties are represented by an
attorney, service of any paper, pleading or notice, provided by in
these rules may be made upon the representative of either party
and shall constitute service on the party.
13-9. Hearing. The hearing of said matter shall be at a time,
place and day fixed by the Commission, before all the members of
the Commission or a majority thereof or before a member of the
Commission who may be delegated to hear the same. The parties may
appear in person or may be represented by a member of the Utah
State Bar. The Commission shall determine at the hearing the mode
and procedure to be followed which as nearly as it may deem
practicable will follow the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
13-10. Admissibility of Evidence. At all hearings the Commission will determine the admissibility of evidence and shall use as
near as it deems practicable the rules of evidence followed in the
Courts in this State.
13-11. Oath of Witnesses. Every witness in a hearing before
the commission shall first be sworn to testify truthfully as
provided by law. The oath shall be administered by a member of
the Commission.
13-12. Determination from the Record. Where the hearing of any
matter is before less than all the members of the Commission,
final determination thereof shall be made by the Commission from
the files, records and abstracts of the testimony introduced at
said hearing.
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Murray City Police Department
Policies and Procedures
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P.

Receiving or accepting money or anything ot value for special fa\ors
to persons or individuals in connection with official duty. (Section
400)

Q.

Willfully disobeying the lawful orders of a superior officer or
supervisor. (Section 400)

R.

Any other misconduct, inefficiency or dereliction. (Section 400)

Internal Affairs
I.

Purpose: The internal affairs function exists for the purpose of insuring the
integrity of the Murray Police Department, through an internal process
where objectivity, fairness, and justice are assured by intensive, impartial
investigation and review.

II.

Internal Affairs Unit Responsibilities: It is the responsibility of the internal
affairs unit to record and control the investigation of complaints against
members, supervise and control the investigation of alleged or suspected
misconduct within the Murray Police Department, and maintain the
confidentiality of internal affairs investigations and records.
A.

The internal affairs unit is supervised by the Chief of Police.

B.

Pursuant to requirements of this policy, the Internal Affairs Unit will
be notified of all complaints against members for:

C.

1.

Criminal misconduct

2.

Excessive use of force

3.

Corruption

4.

Breach of Civil Rights

5.

Policy and procedure violations

Line supervisors are responsible for the investigation of policy and
procedure violations which, if sustained, would normally result in
minor discipline. All other complaints will be investigated by or
5.8

Murray City Police Department
Policies and Procedures

under the direction of Internal Affairs. Internal Affairs will
investigate or assist in investigating any complaint at the direction of
the Chief of Police or at the request of any Division Commander.
III.

Complaint Processing
A.

All complaints will be investigated. As appropriate, the extent of
the investigation may be limited to substantiating falsity of
accusations.

B.

Investigations will be conducted using such investigatory actions,
techniques and resources as are appropriately consistent with other
provisions of the Murray Police Department Rules and Regulations
Polices and Procedures Manual.

C.

Investigations will be fully documented, including the investigatory
actions, facts determined, and disposition of the complaint. Such
record will be maintained in a secure area by Internal Affairs
investigator.

D.

Complainants may be periodically advised of the general status and
investigation by the Internal Affairs Unit.

E.

Internal Affairs investigations will be completed within thirty (30)
days with status reporting done every seven (7) days. Extensions will
be authorized by the Chief of Police in those cases where
extenuating circumstances exist.

F.

As appropriate, Internal Affairs may seek legal advice and assistance
in case preparation from the City Attorney's Office. All alleged
criminal conduct will be reviewed with the Murray City Attorney's
Office or Salt Lake County Attorney's Office or Utah Attorney
General's Office.

G.

Prior to any interview of an accused member as part of an Internal
Affairs investigation, the member will be given written notification
of the allegations, and their rights and responsibilities relative to the
investigation.

5.9
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Art. XI, § 5

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Sec. 5. [Municipal corporations — To be created by general law — Right and manner of adopting charter
for own government — Powers included.]
Corporations for municipal purposes shall not be created by special laws.
The legislature by general laws shall provide for the incorporation, organization and classification of cities and towns in proportion to population, which
laws may be altered, amended or repealed. Any incorporated city or town may
frame and adopt a charter for its own government in the following manner:
The legislative authority of the city may, by two-thirds vote of its members,
and upon petition of qualified electors to the number of fifteen per cent of all
votes cast at the next preceding election for the office of the mayor, shall
forthwith provide by ordinance for the submission to the electors of the question: "Shall a commission be chosen to frame a charter?" The ordinance shall
require that the question be submitted to the electors at the next regular
municipal election. The ballot containing such question shall also contain the
names of candidates for members of the proposed commission, but without
party designation. Such candidates shall be nominated in the same manner as
required by law for nomination of city officers. If a majority of the electors
voting on the question of choosing a commission shall vote in the affirmative,
then the fifteen candidates receiving a majority of the votes cast at such
election, shall constitute the charter commission, and shall proceed to frame a
charter.
Any charter so framed shall be submitted to the qualified electors of the city
at an election to be held at a time to be determined by the charter commission,
which shall be not less than sixty days subsequent to its completion and
distribution among the electors and not more than one year from such date.
Alternative provisions may also be submitted to be voted upon separately.
The commission shall make provisions for the distribution of copies of the
proposed charter and of any alternative provisions to the qualified electors of
the city, not less than sixty days before the election at which it is voted upon.
Such proposed charter and such alternative provisions as are approved by a
majority of the electors voting thereon, shall become an organic law of such
city at such time as may be fixed therein, and shall supersede any existing
charter and all laws affecting the organization and government of such city
which are now in conflict therewith. Within thirty days after its approval a
copy of such charter as adopted, certified by the mayor and city recorder and
authenticated by the seal of such city, shall be made in duplicate and deposited, one in the office of the secretary of State and the other in the office of the
city recorder, and thereafter all courts shall take judicial notice of such charter.
Amendments to any such charter may be framed and submitted by a charter commission in the same manner as provided for making of charters, or
may be proposed by the legislative authority of the city upon a two-thirds vote
thereof, or by petition of qualified electors to a number equal to fifteen per
cent of the total votes cast for mayor on the next preceding election, and any
such amendment may be submitted at the next regular municipal election,
and having been approved by the majority of the electors voting thereon, shall
become part of the charter at the time fixed in such amendment and shall be
certified and filed as provided in case of charters.
208

COUNTIES, CITIES AND TOWNS

Art. XI, § 5

Each city forming its charter under this section shall have, and is hereby
granted, the authority to exercise all powers relating to municipal affairs, and
to adopt and enforce within its limits, local police, sanitary and similar regulations not in conflict with the general law, and no enumeration of powers in
this constitution or any law shall be deemed to limit or restrict the general
grant of authority hereby conferred; but this grant of authority shall not
include the power to regulate public utilities, not municipally owned, if any
such regulation of public utilities is provided for by general law, nor be
deemed to limit or restrict the power of the legislature in matters relating to
State affairs, to enact general laws applicable alike to all cities of the State.
The power to be conferred upon the cities by this section shall include the
following:
(a) To levy, assess and collect taxes and borrow money, within the
limits prescribed by general law, and to levy and collect special assessments for benefits conferred.
(b) To furnish all local public services, to purchase, hire, construct,
own, maintain and operate, or lease, public utilities local in extent and
use; to acquire by condemnation, or otherwise, within or without the
corporate limits, property necessary for any such purposes, subject to
restrictions imposed by general law for the protection of other communities; and to grant local public utility franchises and within its powers
regulate the exercise thereof.
(c) To make local public improvements and to acquire by condemnation, or otherwise, property within its corporate limits necessary for such
improvements; and also to acquire an excess over than [that] needed for
any such improvement and to sell or lease such excess property with
restrictions, in order to protect and preserve the improvement.
(d) To issue and sell bonds on the security of any such excess property,
or of any public utility owned by the city, or of the revenues thereof, or
both, including, in the case of public utility, a franchise stating the terms
upon which, in case of foreclosure, the purchaser may operate such utility.
History: Const. 1896.
Compiler's Notes. — The bracketed word
"that" in Subsection (c) of the last paragraph
appeared in this section as published in the
Revised Statutes of 1933.
Cross-References. — Incorporation of cities
and towns, § 10-2-101 et seq.

Local improvements, § 10-7-20.
Miscellaneous powers of cities and towns,
§ 10-1-202.
Municipal Code, home rule exceptions to,
§§ 10-1-106, 10-3-818.
Powers and duties of all cities, § 10-8-1 et
seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Classification of cities.
Debt limit.
Improvement districts.
Initiated ordinance.
Legislative power.
Mass transportation system.
Municipal power.
Ordinance licensing nonprofit clubs.
Police power.
Power versus right to operate public utility.

Repeal of council-manager charter of city.
Sewage disposal.
Water conservancy districts.
Withholding tax provision.
Cited.
Classification of cities.
The power of the legislature to classify cities
according to population is expressly conferred
by this section, and statute passed to enable
cities of first class to meet needs and requirements of larger municipalities was general, in
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10-3-1001

CITIES AND TOWNS

PART 10
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
10-3-1001. Subordinates in police, health, and fire depart,
ments to be appointed from list.
The head of each of the police and fire departments of cities of the first and
second class and the health officer in cities of the first class shall, by and with
the advice and consent of the board of city commissioners, and subject to the
rules and regulations of the civil service commission, appoint from the
classified civil service list furnished by the civil service commission all
subordinate officers, employees, members or agents in his department, and in
like manner fill all vacancies in the same.
History: C. 1953,10-3-1001, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 48, § 3.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Accountability of officers.
A police officer is responsible only to the head
of his department, to whom has been given the

power of his appointment and removal from
office. Roe v. Lundstrom, 89 Utah 520, 57 P.2d
1128 (1936).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 15 Am. Jur. 2d Civil Service
§ 1 et seq.

C.J.S. — 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations
§§ 570 to 572, 602, 603, 653, 654, 711 to 717.

10-3-1002. Classified civil service — Employment constituting.
The classified civil service shall consist of all places of employment now
existing or hereafter created in or under the police department and the fire
department of each city of the first and second class, and the health department in cities of the first class, except the head of the departments, deputy
chiefs of the police and fire departments and assistant chiefs of the police
department in cities of the first and second class, and the members of the board
of health of the departments. No appointments to any of the places of
employment constituting the classified civil service in the departments shall be
made except according to law and under the rules and regulations of the Civil
Service Commission. The head of each of the departments may, and the deputy
chiefs of the police and fire departments and assistant chiefs of the police
department shall, be appointed from the classified civil service, and upon the
expiration of his term or upon the appointment of a successor shall be returned
thereto.
History: C. 1953,10-3-1002, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 48, § 3; 1977, ch. 44, § 1.
Compiler's Notes. — This section is derived
from former § 10-10-10 and, pursuant to § 10-

1-115, has been revised to incorporate the
amendment of § 10-10-10 by Laws 1977, ch. 44,
§ 1.
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10-3-1005

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
QJJS. — 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations
*$ 570 to 572, 602, 603, 653, 654, 711 to 717.
AXJ*- — Determination as to good faith in
abolition of public office or employment subject
t/> civil service or merit system, 87 A.L.R.3d

3«.

Validity, under Federal Constitution, of regulations, rules, or statutes requiring random or
mass drug testing of public employees or persons whose employment is regulated by state,
local, or federal government, 86 A.L.R. Fed.

42

°-

10-3-1003. Commission — Number, term, vacancies.
In each city of the first and second class there shall be a civil service
commission, consisting of three members appointed by the board of commissioners. Their term of office shall be six years, but they shall be appointed so
that the term of office of one member shall expire on the 30th day of June of
each even-numbered year. If a vacancy occurs in the civil service commission,
it shall be filled by appointment by the board of city commissioners for the
unexpired term.
History: C. 1953,10-3-1003, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 48, S 3.

10-3-1004. Qualifications of commissioners — Salary —
Removal.
Not more than two members of the civil service commission shall at any one
time be of the same political party. No member of the civil service commission
shall during his tenure of office hold any other public office, or be a candidate
for any other public office. Each member shall receive $25 for each meeting of
the commission which he shall attend, but shall not receive more than $100 in
any one month. In case of misconduct, inability or willful neglect in the
performance of the duties of the office by any member, the member may be
removedfromoffice by the board of city commissioners by a majority vote of the
entire membership, but the member shall, if he so desires, have opportunity to
be heard in defense.
History: C. 1953,10-3-1004, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 48, § 3; 1977, ch. 39, § 1.
Compiler's Notes. — This section is derived
from former § 10-10-12 and, pursuant to § 10-

1-115, has been revised to incorporate the
amendment of § 10-10-12 by Laws 1977, ch. 39,
§ 1.

10-3-1005. Organization of commission — Secretary —
Offices.
The civil service commission shall organize by selecting one of its members
chairman, and shall appoint as secretary one of the available officers or
employees of the city, who shall act and serve without additional compensation. The secretary shall keep a record of all meetings of the civil service
commission and of its work and shall perform such other services as the
commission may require, and shall have the custody of the books and records
of the commission. The board of city commissioners shall provide suitable
accommodations and equipment to enable the civil service commission to
attend to its business.
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10-3-1006

CITIES AND TOWNS

History: C. 1963,10-3-1005, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 48, § 3.

10-3-1006. Rules and regulations — Printing and distribution.
The civil service commission shall make all necessary rules and regulations
to carry out the purposes of this part and for examinations, appointments and
promotions. All rules and regulations shall be printed by the civil service
commission for distribution.
History: C. 1953,10-3-1006, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 48, § 3.

10-3-1007.

Examinations.

All applicants for employment in the classified civil service shall be subject
to examination, which shall be public, competitive and free. Examinations
shall be held at such times and places as the civil service commission shall
from time to time determine, and shall be for the purpose of determining the
qualifications of applicants for positions. Examinations shall be practical and
shall fairly test the fitness in every respect of the persons examined to
discharge the duties of the positions to which they seek to be appointed, and
shall include tests of physical qualifications and health.
History: C. 1953,10-3-1007, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 48, § 3.

10-3-1008. Appointments from civil service list — Probation period.
In all cases the appointing power shall notify the civil service commission of
each separate position to be filled, and shall fill such place by the appointment
of one of the persons certified by the commission therefor. Such appointment
shall be on probation, and of a character and for a period to be prescribed by
the civil service commission.
History: C. 1953,10-3-1008, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 48, § 3.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations
§ 714.

10-3-1009. Certification of applicants for position — Number — Eligible lists, removal.
Whenever a position in the classified civil sendee is to be filled, the civil
service commission shall as soon as possible certify to the appointing power the
names of five persons to fill such position from those persons having the
highest standing in the eligible Ust but a lesser number may be certified when
there is not the required number on the eligible Ust. If more than one position
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JUDICIAL CODE

78-23-15. Exemption provisions applicable in bankruptcy
proceedings.
No individual may exempt from the property of the estate in any bankruptcy
proceeding the property specified in Subsection (d) of Section 522 of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act (Public Law 95-598), except as may otherwise be
expressly permitted under this chapter.
History: C. 1953, 78-23-15, enacted by L.
1981, ch. I l l , § 15.
Federal Law. — For Subsection (d) of Sec-

tion 522 of Bankruptcy Reform Act, see 11
U.S.C. § 522(d).

CHAPTER 24
WITNESSES
Section
78-24-1.
78-24-2.
78-24-3.
78-24-4.
78-24-5.
78-24-6.
78-24-7.
78-24-8.
78-24-9.
78-24-10.

Section
Who may be witnesses — Jury to
judge credibility.
Competency to be witness.
Judge or juror may be witness —
Procedure.
Interpreters — Subpoena — Contempt.
Subpoena defined.
Duty of witness served with subpoena.
Liability to forfeiture and damages.
Privileged communications.
Duty to answer questions — Privilege.
Proceedings in aid of or supple-

78-24-11.
78-24-12.
78-24-13.
78-24-14.
78-24-15.
78-24-16.
78-24-17.
78-24-18.
78-24-19.

mental to attachment, garnishment, or execution.
Rights of witnesses.
Witnesses — Exempt from arrest
in civil action.
Unlawful arrest — Void — Damages recoverable.
Liability of officer making arrest.
Discharge of witness unlawfully
arrested.
Oaths — Who may administer.
Form.
Affirmation or declaration instead
of oath allowed.
Variance in form of swearing to
suit witness' belief.

78-24-1. Who may be witnesses — Jury to judge credibility.
All persons, without exception, otherwise than as specified in this chapter,
who, having organs of sense, can perceive, and, perceiving, can make known
their perceptions to others, may be witnesses. Neither parties nor other
persons who have an interest in the event of an action or proceeding are
excluded; nor those who have been convicted of crime; nor persons on account
of their opinions on matters of religious belief; although, in every case the
credibility of the witness may be drawn in question, by the manner in which he
testifies, by the character of his testimony, or by evidence affecting his
character for truth, honesty or integrity, or by his motives, or by contradictory
evidence; and the jury are the exclusive judges of his credibility.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-24-1.
Cross-References. — Admissibility of evidence, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43(a).
Competency of judge as witness, Utah Rules
of Evidence, Rule 605.
Competency of juror as witness, Utah Rules
of Evidence, Rule 606.

Competency of witnesses generally, Utah
Rules of Evidence, Rule 601.
Jury to decide questions of fact, § 78-21-2;
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 39(a).
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, husband and wife competent, may not assert privilege, § 77-31-22.
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ARTICLE I.
GENERAL PROVISIONS.
fllJle

101* Scope.

These rules govern proceedings in the courts of this State, to the extent and
• H the exceptions stated in Rule 1101.

AviBory Committee Note. — Adapted
Rule 101, Uniform Rules of Evidence
frg?4) Rule 1101 contains exceptions dealing
($L preliminary questions of fact, grand jury
i ^ ^ i n g s , miscellaneous judicial or quasi.juPf^proceedings and summary contempt proS i g s . Rule 101 and H01 are comparabh to
**£ 2 of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1971),
SSept that Rule 2 made applicable other pro-

2&tt£S£SE$Z'gSg:
^ d e n c e . In addition, Rule 2 of the Utah

Rules of Evidence applicable in all instances in
courts of the state including situations previously governed by statute, except to the extent
that specific statutory provisions are expressly
retained. Rule 101 also rejects Lopes v. Lopes,
3 0 Utah 2d 393, 518 P.2d 687 (1974) to the
extent ^
i t pe^ts a d h o c development of
^ ^
i n s i s t e n t with these
of ^
^
of Evidence.

B m
^!^«^Jr?!Zl
'° f 164 (Utah 1978) that statutory^provi-

688 R 2

of

ST of Evidence (1971) expressly made the 8 1 0 n s o f evidence law mconsistent with the
inapplicable to both civil and criminal pro- rvim will take precedence is rejected.
T
^- lg
Cross-References. — Evidence generally,
ce
^ 1 0 1 adopts a general policy making the § 78-25-2 et seq.; Rule 43, U.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
B

Bail hearings*
The former Utah Rules of Evidence were aprlicable to and controlling at bail hearings.

Chynoweth v. Larson, 572 P.2d 1081 (Utah
1977).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evidence 1983, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 63, 68.
Utah Rules of Evidence 1983 — Part II, 1987
Utah L. Rev. 467.

Biased Evidence Rules: A Framework for Judicial Analysis and Reform, 1992 Utah L. Rev.
67.

Rule 102. Purpose and construction.
These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the $nd that the truth may be ascertained and
proceedings justly determined.
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 102 is
the federal rule, verbatim, and is an adjuration
as to the purpose of the Rules of Evidence.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah
1986); State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah
1986).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 95, 130.

Rule 103. Rulings on evidence.
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling
which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is
affected, and
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely
objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground
of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the
substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was
apparent from the context within which questions were asked.
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(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any other or further
statement which shows the character of the evidence, the form in which it ^a$
offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. It may direct the making
of an offer in question and answer form.
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the
extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being sug*
gested to the jury by any means, such as making statements or offers of proof
or asking questions in the hearing of the jury.
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors
affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of
the court.
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 103 is
the federal rule, verbatim, and is in conformity
with Rules 4 and 5, Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971), Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
and Utah case law not involving constitutional
considerations. Subsection (a)(1) is in accord
with Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971)
and Stagmeyer v. Leatham Bros., 20 Utah 2d
421, 439 P.2d 279 (1968). See also Bradford v.
Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980);

Szarak v. Sandoval, 636 P.2d 1082 (Utah
1981). Rule 103(d) is a restatement of the plai^
error rule. See Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971) and State v. Poe, 21 Utah 2d 113, 441
P.2d 512 (1968).
Cross-References. — Harmless error in admission or exclusion of evidence, Rule 61
U.RC.P.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Applicability.
Bench trial.
Erroneous rulings.
—Cumulative evidence.
—Exclusion.
—Harmless error.
—Objection.
—Offer of proof.
—Substantial right or prejudice.
—Waiver.
Plain error.
Purpose.
Cited.
Applicability.
Adequacy under Subdivision (a)(2) of plaintiffs proffer of expert testimony was irrelevant
where the trial court's exclusion of the testimony was a case management decision and the
substance of the testimony had no bearing on
the court's decision, because the exclusion of
testimony was not an evidentiary ruling to
which Subdivision (a)(2) would apply. Berrett
v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 830 P.2d 291 (Utah
Ct. App.), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah
1992).
Bench trial
When a trial is to a court, the rulings on
evidence are not of such critical moment as
when a trial is to a jury, because it is to be
assumed that the court has, and will use, its
superior knowledge as to competency and the
effect which should be given evidence. Super
Tire Mkt., Inc. v. Rollins, 18 Utah 2d 122, 417
P.2d 132 (1966).
Erroneous rulings.
—Cumulative evidence.
Even if refusal to admit photographs was
error, no prejudice resulted to defendant where
the evidence was cumulative and could have
added nothing to defendant's case. Godesky v.
Provo City Corp., 690 P.2d 541 (Utah 1984).

—Exclusion.
When evidence is excluded by the trial court,
any error which may have resulted from such
exclusion is cured when the substance of the
evidence is later admitted through some other
means. State v. Stephens, 667 P.2d 586 (Utah
1983).
—Harmless error.
Where there was no likelihood that the testimony in question had any substantial bearing
on the outcome of the trial, it was not a cause
for reversal. Stagmeyer v. Leatham Bros., 20
Utah 2d 421, 439 P.2d 279 (1968).
Admission of hearsay testimony connecting
defendant with the crime was not prejudicial
where there was other testimony connecting
the defendant to the crime adduced before the
hearsay testimony. State v. Gardunio, 652 P.2d
1342 (Utah 1982).
The improper admission of hearsay evidence
was harmless error where the exclusion of such
evidence was not likely to produce a different
result. In re Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111
(Utah 1982).
Denial of a defendant's motion to suppress
certain identification evidence was not a ruling
upon which error can be predicated where
there was other ample evidence of the defendant's culpability. State v. Bullock, 699 P.2d
753 (Utah 1985).
Trial court's error in restricting defense
counsel's cross-examination of the prosecution's key witness concerning bias was harmless, where the jury had sufficient information
to fully appraise the witness's biases and motivations. State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200 (Utah
1987).
Admission of improper impeachment evidence was not prejudicial error, where the testimony did not bear directly on whether defendant did or did not do any of the acts with
which he was charged, and there was no indication that the testimony improperly influ-
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Rule 607. Who may impeach.
The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including ^
party calling the witness.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and is similar to
Rule 20, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971).

Amendment Notes. — The 1992 ame^
ment, effective October 1, 1992, revised t ^
rule to make the language gender-neutral

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Ability to remember.
Collateral issue.
Extrinsic evidence.
Cited.
Ability to remember.
It was error for the court to prevent crossexamination that probed a robbery victim's
possible inability to remember events that
might have been exculpatory. State v. Morrell,
803 P.2d 292 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

Collateral issue.
* • *? what constitutes a collateral i ^
u
P ° n w l u c h a P*** m a v n o t ** impeaxhed, a*
State v. Mitchell, 571 P.2d 1351 (Utah 1977).
Extrinsic evidence.
Extrinsic evidence relevant to issues of cred.
ibility is admissible. State v. Rammel, 721 P^i
495 (Utah 1986).
„,± m . _ x
__
w#x . „ „ ,
Cited m State v. Mitchell, 571 P.2d 1351
(Utah 1977).

Rule 608. Evidence of character and conduct of witness.
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility of a
witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or
reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to
character for truthftdness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has
been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a
witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility,
other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by
extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination
of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness,
does not operate as a waiver of the accused's or the witness' privilege against
self-incrimination when examined with respect to matters which relate only
to credibility.
(c) Evidence of bias. Bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be
shown to impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by
evidence otherwise adduced.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Advisory Committee Note. — Subdivisions
(a) and (b) are the federal rule, verbatim, and
are comparable to Rules 22 and 6, Utah Rules
of Evidence (1971), except to the extent that
Subdivision (a) limits such evidence to credibility for truthfulness or untruthfulness. Rule
22(c), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) allowed a
broader attack on the character of a witness as
to truth, honesty and integrity.
This rule should be read in conjunction with
Rule 405. Subdivision (b) allows, in the discretion of the court on cross-examination, inquiry
into specific instances of the witness's conduct
relative to his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness or specific instances of conduct of
a person as to whom the witness has provided

character testimony. See, State v. Adams, 26
Utah 2d 377, 489 P.2d 1191 (1971). Attack
upon a witness's credibility by specific instances of character other than conviction of a
crime is inadmissible under current Utah law.
Cf. Bullock v. Ungricht, 538 P.2d 190 (Utah
1975); Rule 47, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971).
Allowing cross-examination of a witness as to
specific instances affecting character for truthfulness is new to Utah practice and in accord
with the decision in Michelson v. United
States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948). The cross-examination of a character witness as to specific instances of conduct which the character witness
may have heard about concerning the person
whose character is placed in evidence has been
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Rule 1101

tiixle 1007. Testimony or written admission of party.
Contents of writings, recordings, or photographs may be proved by the testif y or deposition of the party against whom offered or by that party's writJ*1 admission, without accounting for the nonproduction of the original.
f e n d e d effective October 1, 1992.)
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
federal rule, verbatim. There was no comArable rule in the Utah Rules of Evidence
/*o71), but the rule appears to be in accord
J^fl! Utah practice.

Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective October 1, 1992, revised this
rule to make the language gender-neutral.

Utile 1008. Functions of court and jury.
When the admissibility of other evidence of contents of writings, recordings,
photographs under these rules depends upon the fulfillment of a condition
of fact, the question whether the condition has been fulfilled is ordinarily for
^ e court to determine in accordance with the provisions of Rule 104. However, when an issue is raised (a) whether the asserted writing ever existed, or
(b) whether another writing, recording, or photograph produced at the trial is
the original, or (c) whether other evidence of contents correctly reflects the
contents, the issue is for the trier of fact to determine as in the case of other
issues of fact.
oT

Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantially

the same as Rule 70(2), Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971).

ARTICLE XI.
MISCELLANEOUS RULES.
Rule 1101. Applicability of rules.
(a) Courts and magistrates. These rules apply to all actions and proceedings in the courts of this state except as otherwise provided in Subdivision (b).
(b) Rules inapplicable. The rules (other than with respect to privileges) do
not apply in the following situations:
(1) Preliminary questions of fact which are to be determined under
Rule 104(a);
(2) Grand jury proceedings;
(3) Miscellaneous proceedings for extradition, sentencing or granting
or revocation of probation, issuance of warrants for arrest, criminal summonses and search warrants and proceedings with respect to release on
bail or otherwise;
(4) Contempt proceedings in which the court may act summarily;
(5) In a preliminary examination, nothing in these rules shall be construed to prevent the admission of reliable hearsay evidence.
(Amended effective January 1, 1995.)
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
substantially Rule 1101, Uniform Rules of Evidence (1974). It departs from the Federal Rules
of Evidence primarily in applying the Rules of
Evidence to preliminary examinations in criminal cases.
Subdivision (3) changes the rule of
Chynoweth v. Larson, 572 P.2d 1081 (Utah
1977), concerning the application of the Rules
of Evidence to bail proceedings.
Amendment Notes. — The Supreme Court

of Utah, by order dated February 23, 1994,
amended this rule by adding Subdivision
(b)(5), effective "upon the effective date of a
similarly worded amendment to Article I, Section 12 of the constitution of the State of
Utah." The cited amendment was proposed by
L. 1994, S.J.R. 6, § 1, approved by the voters at
the 1994 general election, and became effective
on January 1, 1995.
Cross-References. — Grand jury, evidence
receivable by, § 77-10a-13.

R477-10-3

HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

(5) DHRM shall provide assistance to agency
management upon request.
R477-10-3. E m p l o y e e D e v e l o p m e n t a n d Training.
Agency management may establish a program for
training and staff development consistent with
these rules.
(1) All agency sponsored training shall be agency
specific or designed for highly specialized or technical jobs and tasks.
(2) Agency management shall consult with the
Executive Director, DHRM, when proposed training
and development activities may have statewide impact or may be offered more cost effectively on a
statewide basis. The Executive Director, DHRM,
shall determine whether DHRM will be responsible
for t h e training.
(3) The Executive Director, DHRM, shall work
with agency management to establish principles to
guide the development of statewide activities and to
facilitate sharing of resources statewide.
(4) When an agency directs an employee to participate in an educational program, t h e agency shall
pay full costs before the course begins.
(5) Agencies are required to provide refresher
training and make reasonable efforts to re-qualify
veterans reemployed under USERRA, as long as it
does not cause an undue hardship to the employing
agency.
R477-10-4. E d u c a t i o n Assistance.
State agencies may assist employees in their educational goals by granting employees administrative
leave to attend classes and/or a subsidy of educational expenses.
(1) The following conditions shall be met for subsidies of education:
(a) The educational program will provide a benefit
to the state.
(b) The employee shall successfully complete the
required course work with a passing grade.
(c) The employee shall agree to repay any assistance received if the employee voluntarily terminates within 12 months of completing educational
work.
(d) Education assistance shall not exceed $1,500
per employee in any one fiscal year unless approved
in advance by t h e agency head.
(2) Agency management shall be responsible for
detennining the taxable/non-taxable status of educational assistance reimbursements.
References: 67-19-6.
History: 10151, AMD, 09/14/89; 10811, AMD, 07/02/90;
11817, AMD, 07/01/91; 12342, NSC, 11/27/91; 12878, AMD,
07/01/92; 14496, AMD, 07/01/93; 15873, AMD, 07/01/94;
16130, R&E, 10/03/94; 16928, AMD, 07/03/95; 17778, AMD,
07/02/96.

R477-11. Discipline.
R477-11-1. Disciplinary Action.
R477-11-2. Dismissal or Demotion.
30

R477-11-1. D i s c i p l i n a r y A c t i o n .
(1) Agency management may discipline any employee for any of the following reasons:
(a) noncompliance with these rules, agency or
other applicable policies, including but not limited to
safety policies, agency professional standards and
workplace policies;
(b) work performance t h a t is inefficient or incompetent;
(c) failure to maintain skills and adequate performance levels;
(d) insubordination or disloyalty to the orders of a
superior;
(e) misfeasance, malfeasance, nonfeasance or failure to advance the good of the public service;
(f) any incident involving intimidation, physical
harm or t h r e a t s of physical h a r m against co-workers, management, or the public.
(2) All disciplinary actions of career service employees shall be governed by principles of due process. In all such cases, except as provided under
Subsection 67-19-18(4), the disciplinary process
shall include all of the following:
(a) The agency representative notifies the employee in writing of the proposed discipline and the
reasons.
(b) The employee must reply within five working
days in order to have the agency representative
consider the reply before discipline is imposed.
(c) If an employee waives the right to respond or
does not reply within the time frame established by
the agency representative or within five days,
whichever is longer, discipline may be imposed in
accordance with these rules.
(3) After a career service employee has been informed of the reasons for the proposed discipline and
has been given an opportunity to respond and be
responded to, the agency representative may discipline t h a t employee, or any non-career service employee not subject to the same procedural rights, by
imposing one or more of the following:
(a) Written reprimand
(b) Suspension without pay up to 30 calendar days
per incident requiring discipline
(c) Demotion of any employee through one of the
following methods:
(i) An employee may be moved from a position in
one class to a position in another class having a
lower entrance salary if the duties of the position
have been reduced for disciplinary reasons.
(ii) A demotion within the employee's current pay
range may be accomplished by lowering the employee's salary rate back on the range, as determined by
the agency head or designee.
(d) Dismissal
(i) An agency head shall dismiss or demote a
career service employee only in accordance with the
provision of Subsection 67-19-18(5). See R477-11-2
of these rules.
(e) When deciding the specific type and severity of
the discipline to administer to any employee, the
agency representative may consider the following
factors:
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ADMINISTRATION
(i) Consistent application of rules and standards
(ii) Prior knowledge of rules and standards
(iii) The severity of the infraction
(iv) The repeated nature of violations
(v) Prior disciplinary/corrective actions
(vi) Previous oral warnings, written warnings and
discussions
(vii) The employee's past work record
(viii) The effect on agency operations
(ix) The potential of the violations for causing
damage to persons or property.
(4) If an agency determines t h a t a career service
employee endangers or threatens the peace and
safety of others or poses a grave t h r e a t to the public
service or is charged with aggravated or repeated
misconduct, the agency may impose t h e following
actions, as provided by 67-19-18-(4), pending an
investigation and determination of facts:
(a) Paid administrative leave
(b) Temporary reassignment to another position or
work location at the same r a t e of pay
(5) At the time disciplinary action is imposed, the
employee shall be notified in writing of the discipline, the reasons for the discipline, t h e effective
date and length of the discipline.
(6) Disciplinary actions are subject to the grievance and appeals procedure as provided by law for
career service employees only. The employee and the
agency representative may agree in writing to waive
or extend any grievance step, or the time limits
specified for any grievance step.
R477-11-2. D i s m i s s a l o r D e m o t i o n .
An employee may be dismissed or demoted for
cause as explained under R477-10-2 and R477-11-1
of these rules, and through t h e process outlined in
this rule.
(1) An agency head or appointing officer may
dismiss or demote a non-career service status employee without right of appeal by providing written
notification to the employee specifying t h e reasons
for the dismissal or demotion and the effective date.
(2) No employee shall be dismissed or demoted
from a career service position unless t h e agency
head or designee has observed t h e Grievance Procedure Rules and law cited in R137-1-13 and Title 67,
Chapter 19a and the following procedures:
(a) The agency head or designee shall notify the
employee in writing of the specific reasons for the
dismissal or demotion.
(b) The employee shall have u p to five working
days to reply. The employee m u s t reply within five
working days for the agency representative to consider the reply before discipline is imposed.
(c) The employee shall have an opportunity to be
heard by the agency head or designee.
(d) Following a hearing, if t h e agency head finds
adequate cause or reason, an employee may be
dismissed or demoted.
(3) Agency management may suspend an employee with pay pending the administrative appeal
to the agency head.
October 1, 1996

References: 67-19-6.
History: 10152, AMD, 09/14/89; 10812, AMD, 07/02/90;
10978, NSC, 10/01/90; 11818, AMD, 07/01/91; 12343, NSC,
11/27/91; 14520, AMD, 07/15/93; 15874, AMD, 07/01/94;
16131, R&E, 10/03/94; 16929, AMD, 07/03/95; 17148, NSC,
09/01/95; 17779, AMD, 07/02/96.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Authorized discipline.
—Suspension.
Dismissal.
Due process.
Authorized discipline.
—Suspension.
Review board exceeded its authority when it overturned
the decision of a hearing officer upholding the termination
of a prison employee who, after a prisoner spat in his face,
retaliated by striking the prisoner, based on a speculative
conclusion that the employee would not have retaliated
had he received adequate AIDS training. The board also
exceeded its authority in substituting a fifteen-month
suspension for the termination, as it had no authority to
impose such a suspension, but could only impose one or
more of the following: (a) written reprimand; (b) suspension without pay for up to thirty days per occurrence
requiring discipline; (c) demotion; or (d) dismissal. (Former
R665-1, R20-11.) Utah Dep't of Cors. v. Sucher, 796 R2d
721 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Dismissal.
Dismissal did not violate due process rights of a career
service status public employee who pled guilty to forgery
while holding a position of great fiduciary responsibility. It
is not unfair or violative of employee's due process rights to
hold him responsible for having prior knowledge that the
commission of a forgery is a crime of moral turpitude and
against the public policy of the state. (Former R468-11-1.)
Kent v. Department of Emp. Sec, 860 P.2d 984 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993).
Due process.
Once an agency fulfills its initial burden of providing a
factual basis for its allegations and its burden of demonstrating that its sanction is not disproportionate, the
employee must then raise due process concerns and/or
rebut the agency's evidence. If the employee fails to do so,
there is no basis on which to find that the agency's sanction
"amounts to an abuse of discretion." Lunnen v. Utah DOT,
886 P.2d 70 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
R477-12. Separations.
R477-12-1.
R477-12-2.
R477-12-3.
R477-12-4.

Resignation.
Abandonment of Position.
Reduction in Force.
Exceptions.

R477-12-1. R e s i g n a t i o n .
Employees may resign by giving written or verbal
notice to the appointing authority. In this rule, the
word employee refers to career service employees,
unless otherwise indicated.
(1) Agency management may accept an employee's
resignation without prejudice when the resignation
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occurred?
A

No.

Q

Not a word?

A

No.

Q

Didn't laugh and joke about the

situation?
A

The only thing that was said between us

three -- Lt. Snow is the one that took us down there.
I asked Lt. Snow, "What's going happen to us," if
we're going to be in jail for three, four days.

That

was about it.

I

Q

And you're positive you didn't laugh and

joke about the situation?
A

I promise.

Q

You're as equally certain as the gun was

drawn and pointed at you?
A

Yes.

Q

You took a polygraph examination; is that

correct?
A

Yes.

Q

And in that polygraph examination, Vern

Peterson asked you whether the gun was pointed at
you; didn't he?

That was one of questions he asked?

A

Yes.

Q

He didn't ask you whether it was pointed
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at your head but just at you; right?
A

Yes.

Q

Did he tell you what the results were?

A

Yes.

Q

What did he tell you?

A

He told me that I passed it, and the gun

was pointed from my waist down.
Q

You're certain Vern Peterson told you you

passed the polygraph?
A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

And you never told Vern Peterson

that the gun may not have been pointed at you at all,
it could have been pointed at the floor, you just may|
be mistaken?
A

I told him that?

Q

I'm asking:

A

I don't believe so, no,

Q

Do you know if it was tape recorded?

A

The polygraph?

Q

Yeah.

A

I'm pretty sure it was.

Q

Have you had a chance to review that tape

Did you?

with the city attorney's office?
A

No, I haven't.
MR. BENEVENTO:

WENDY S. ALCOCK —

If I may, I have a copy
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of the tape here.

I'd like to play just a portion to

impeach.
MR. FERGUSON:

Not without some

authenticity.
MR. BENEVENTO:

Can I at least play it

and say if it's his voice?
MR. HALL:

No, I'll object.

MR. FERGUSON:

I think you've got to have

the right witness here to lay the foundation.
MR. BENEVENTO:
subject to recall, then?

Can I at least have it
I think I'm done with this

witness.
MR. FERGUSON:

Can't Vern Peterson

testify that it's him on the tape?
MR. BENEVENTO:

If he's going to say that

that's sufficient foundation, that's fine.
MR. FERGUSON:

He's there, he has

personal knowledge as to who was in the room.
MR. BENEVENTO:
Q

All right.

(BY MR. BENEVENTO)

Did you ever tell

Vern Peterson that you now believe that your life
wasn't threatened but rather it was just a power play|
between you and Officer Lucas?
A

Yes.

Q

So, you didn't feel threatened, then?

WENDY S. ALCOCK -- CAPITOL REPORTERS

Page 53

A

I did, but I don't -- I don't know.

I

feel like he had the power over me because he had a
gun, and I'm the one who was in trouble.

And I feel

it was total power.
Q

And you told Lt. Fondaco that the gun was

pointed at your head the whole time of you emptying
your pockets and taking your hat off; right?
A

I don't know.

Q

You don't know now?

A

This happened so long ago.

Q

You're uncertain?

A

I'm uncertain.

Q

So, your uncertainty isn't that you're

lying; is it?
A

No.

Q

You just can't remember?

A

All I know is that the gun was pulled

out, that's all.
MR. BENEVENTO:

That's all I have, thank

you.
THE CHAIRMAN:

I have two questions.

When you were taken up to the police station, you
said you were placed in a room?
THE WITNESS:
THE CHAIRMAN:

Yes.
Is that a room, rather
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desk.
Q

How far away were you from Officer Lucas?

A

Four feet.

Q

Was there anything between you and

Mr. Lucas which would have obstructed your vision?
A

No.

Q

When you saw the weapon pulled from the

holster, pointed in a downward position, did that
cause you to be concerned?
A

Not so much concern as I found it

somewhat odd.
Q

Why?

A

I had not observed any -- it was not my

opinion that at the time there was an officer safety
issue.
MR. BENEVENTO:

I object on foundation.

He indicated that he hadn't seen the incident, he was
just merely walking by.

He doesn't have foundation

to render an opinion about safety issues in that
room.
MR. HALL:

I think he has an opinion, he

has the right to express his opinion whether or not
there was an officer safety issue there when he's in
direct proximity.
MR. FERGUSON:

Let me ask a couple
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questions, if I can, of the witness.

Had all of the

suspects been searched prior to coming to the room?
THE WITNESS:
search.

As I recall, not a thorough

It was raining really hard when we initially

took them into custody.

And if we did any kind of

searches, they were just a real basic pat down.
were handcuffed.

Theyj

It was to make sure they didn't

have any large weapons at the time.

And so, if there

were any searches at that time, like I said, they
were pretty basic pat downs.
MR. FERGUSON:

When you do a pat down

search, what are you trying to find?
THE WITNESS:
looking for guns, knives.

Outer clothing, we're
The usual ritual is to sayl

guns, knives, shanks, grenades, anything that's going
to hurt me.

They all had coats on, and so it was

just pat down the coats and the outer pockets, make
sure there was nothing that was going to hurt us.
MR. FERGUSON:

So when you say you didn't

think this was a safety issue, what are you
thinking?

What's your basis for that?
THE WITNESS:

I found it odd -- I had

been in speaking with Mr. Spegar before, and I hadn't
felt my -- I hadn't felt in any kind of jeopardy.
I'd left the room, I was coming down off an
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adrenaline, I was relatively new and caught some guys
in the process of doing a vehicle burglary, and I was
feeling pretty good.

And I didn't feel that I was in

any kind of jeopardy,
MR. FERGUSON:

Did you suspect that he

might have a weapon on him at that time7
THE WITNESS:

I didn't know.

I did

observe as he was pulling things out of his pockets
some things that might have been construed as
weapons, like a wrench and screwdriver, a small
flashlight, I believe.
MR. FERGUSON:
THE WITNESS:

When was this?
That's what I observed him

taking out of his pockets.
MR. FERGUSON:
THE WITNESS:

When?
When I observed Officer

Lucas standing in the doorway with his gun out,
MR. FERGUSON:

Okay.

THE CHAIRMAN:

Denied.

I had to get it

straight from my attorney.
Q

(BY MR. HALL)

So, as you were standing

there three or four feet away from Officer Lucas when|
he had his service weapon pulled and pointed towards
Mr. Spegar, in your opinion you hadn't noticed -- you
hadn't noticed or become aware of the officer safety
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Q

And if you see the gun being pulled out,

it's probably too late then?
A

That could be true; that's right.
MR. BENEVENTO:

Thanks.

I don't have

anything further.
MR. HALL:

I have nothing further, thank

you.
MR. FERGUSON:

I have some questions.

THE CHAIRMAN:

Okay.

MR. FERGUSON:

I am a little bit confused

on procedure.

It seems to me that if you are

concerned that somebody might have a weapon, that you
would want to do the search yourself.
THE WITNESS:
MR. FERGUSON:

As far as?

I

Whether he's handcuffed

and can't reach for a weapon.
THE WITNESS:

Yeah, that's when I would

do it.
MR. FERGUSON:

Before you put them in the

automobile, wouldn't you, in terms of your procedure,
want to believe that they were weapon free?
THE WITNESS:

Yes, that's why I stated --

that's why we did an initial pat down, to see if
there were any weapons that would hurt me.
MR. FERGUSON:

And so --
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MR. BENEVENTO:

I'm sorry, Mr, Ferguson,

I don't want to cut you off, but I'm not aware that
you're acting as a commissioner here.

Are the

rules -MR. FERGUSON:
facts out.

It's my job to get the

I can write questions -MR. BENEVENTO:

No, I'm just seeking a

point of clarification, is all, Mr. Ferguson.

And I

thought that you were a legal counselor to provide
answers to legal questions.
MR. FERGUSON:

If you want to try to

limit my role to that, but it's my job to get facts
out to the Commission so that they can make a
decision.
MR. BENEVENTO:

I'm not trying to limit

your role, I'm just seeking a point of clarification,
Mr. Ferguson, as to whether you're to ask the
questions or not.

If it sounds like the Commission

wants you to, then I don't have any objections.
THE CHAIRMAN:

That's true, we do.

MR. FERGUSON:

When the suspects were

first taken to the interrogation rooms, were they
handcuffed?
THE WITNESS:
MR. FERGUSON:

Yes.
Would it have been
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possible to search them then?
THE WITNESS:
MR. FERGUSON:
THE WITNESS:

Yes.
Were they searched then?
I'm trying to recall.

was running between offices.

I

I observed that Officerj

Fernandez had searched one of the individuals.

That

prompted me to want to go back and search Mr. Garcia,
who I had initially searched at the scene where I
found the other screwdriver bits.

And when I came

back, that's when I observed Mr. Spegar pulling items
out of his pocket.
MR. FERGUSON:

When you found the

wrenches, did you keep them or did you put them —
give them back to the suspects?
THE WITNESS:

No, I kept them.

They were

in my coat.
MR. FERGUSON:
terms of searches?

What is your procedure in

Is it normal to have the suspect

remove things from his pocket if you believe that
there might be a weapon in his pocket?
THE WITNESS:
MR. FERGUSON:

No.
What is your procedure in

that regard?
THE WITNESS:

To get them in as safe a

position as possible, possibly handcuffed or in a
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type of arrest position, hands behind their head,
legs spread, that kind of thing, where I instruct
them, "Do not grab the weapon, do not touch it, do
not make any movement towards it or I will shoot
you."

And then retrieve the weapon myself or have

another officer get it.
MR. FERGUSON:

Was there any indication

that any of the suspects were under the influence of
alcohol or drugs?
THE WITNESS:

I didn't observe that at

MR. FERGUSON:

Did you do any testing?

the time.

THE WITNESS:
MR. FERGUSON:

No.
When was the first time

that you made a statement with regard to what went on
that evening?
THE WITNESS:

I did my narrative for the

evening, my report that evening, after we booked them|
in jail.

That's when I did the narrative in regards

to the vehicle burglary.
MR. FERGUSON:

But there weren't any of

these events in that report; is that correct?
THE WITNESS:
MR. FERGUSON:

No.
When was the first time

that you gave a statement or made a report about this
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incident?
THE WITNESS:

After Lt. Fondaco had

called me into his office the first time.
MR. FERGUSON:

How long after the

incident was that?
THE WITNESS:
of the exact time.

Like I said, I'm not sure

A couple of weeks, maybe.

THE CHAIRMAN:
MR. SMITH:

Do you have a question?

I have a couple.

The coats

that the suspects were wearing, were the implements
found in the coats or on their bodies?

Were they

big coats?
THE WITNESS:
other two had jackets.

One had a big coat, the
I believe one had kind of

like a barn jacket that are popular now.

Mr. Garcia

-- the wrenches were found, I believe, in his coat.
However, the screwdriver bits were found on his
person, in his pants pocket.
MR. SMITH:
THE WITNESS:

Where was Spegar's?
He was pulling the items

out of his pants pockets, as I recall.
MR. SMITH:
THE WITNESS:

And he had a short jacket on?
I believe so.

I believe he

was the one that had the barn jacket on.
MR. SMITH:

The other question I have
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circumstance or potentially

life-threatening

circumstances.
MR. HALL:

Thank you.

Appreciate your

time, Doctor.
MR. BENEVENTO:
THE CHAIRMAN:
time.

Nothing.
Doctor, we appreciate your

Wait a minute, we have one question.
MR. FERGUSON:

As I understand your

testimony, it is that when confronted with a
potential life-threatening situation, a person reacts
in a certain way that focuses his attention on that
event and may make his ability to perceive other
things that are around him not accurate.
THE WITNESS:
MR. FERGUSON:
THE WITNESS:
MR. FERGUSON:

Is that --

Yes, sir.
Is that fair?
Yes, sir.
That would also be true

for both people that were in that room?
THE WITNESS:
MR. FERGUSON:

Yes, sir.
The person against whom

the gun was being drawn would have the same problem?
THE WITNESS:
MR. FERGUSON:

Yes, sir.
And may not perceive the

details as to what went on in that room as well as he
might otherwise if he were not threatened?
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THE CHAIRMAN:

Doctor, we appreciate you

taking the time to come down here.

Thank you, very

much.
(Discussion held off the record.)
MR. FERGUSON:

Before everybody goes, let

me just put one thing on the record, because I'm
concerned a little bit here.

Brian, just so you

know, in terms my role here, number one, I don't have
a vote.

Number two, it is not my role, never has

been and will not be, to persuade any of the
Commission members as to how they should vote.

It is

my role, as I perceive it, to make sure that the
facts related to the case are brought forward so that
they can make a decision.
MR. BENEVENTO:

I appreciate it.

I just

haven't been before a Commission that's had an
attorney before.
(Whereupon, lunch recess was taken.)
THE CHAIRMAN:
session.

We are now back in

Where are we?
MR. HALL:

We're at the point where we're

going to call Lt. Pete Fondaco.
LT. PETER FONDACO,
called as a witness, having been first duly sworn,
was examined and testified as follows:
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A

I wrote my recommendation to the Chief,

that would be -- my report is dated July 26th.
Q

So, more than 30 days?

A

Yes .

Q

Do you know that's policy violation?

A

It's not a policy violation unless the

extensions are not authorized by the Chief of
Police.

And, in this case, I did report to the Chief

I would be going on vacation, so the extension was
authorized.
Q

Where is that?

Is that in writing?

A

I believe it's in the internal affairs

section.
Q

I'll give you what they've given me on

all internal affairs, and you can point that out to
me where that is, that extension.
A

It's not in my report.

Q

This is all of the exhibits that

constitute the IA file, as represented by Craig
Hall.

Can you show me where the request for

extension is?
A

No, it's not in there.

Q

Where is it?

A

You mean officially?

written.

There is no

I just have to talk to the Chief and tell
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him; it doesn't say it has to be in writing.
Q

I see.

So, you went to the Chief and

said you needed more time?
A

I told him I was going on vacation, yes.

Q

That's not my question.

You went to the

Chief and said you needed more time?
A

Yes .

Q

When did that occur?

A

Probably around the 14th when we sat

down.

I told him that I was going on vacation.
Q

Did you notify Officer Lucas of the

extension?
A

No, I did not.

Q

You didn't advise him that the

investigation would not be completed within 30 days?
A

No.

But Officer Lucas would know that I

was on vacation.
Q

Yeah.

He knew you were on vacation.

Wasn't there another officer that took your place in
conducting the investigations while you were absent?
A

Yes, Lt. Rowland interviewed two people.

Q

At the time that you did your

investigation, I believe you said that you had
Officer Snow and his statement before you interviewed
Officer Lucas; is that correct?
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A

I interviewed Officer Snow prior to

Officer Lucas?
Q

Yes•

So you knew before you took Officer

Lucas's statement that there -- that at least Officer
Snow says the gun was out?
A

Yes.

Q

Did you, at that particular time, notify

Officer Lucas that the subject matter of the
investigation was dishonesty?
A

It wasn't dishonesty until he denied it.

Q

When did he deny it?

A

In my interview.

Q

That was the, what, 12th?

A

12th.

Q

Did you prepare a revised charge and

present that to Mr. Lucas?
A

No.

Q

Have you ever written a charge and

presented it to Officer Lucas as to what the internal
affairs investigation was about?
A

No.

Q

Do you know that's a violation of policy?

A

I believe he has to be notified, but I

notified him when we were talking -Q

You don't think it needs to be in
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writing?

Are you familiar with your policy,

Department 555, Internal Affairs?
A

Yes, it says that it needs to be in

writing.
Q

Did you do that?

A

No, I did not.

Q

Did you do it when you changed the nature

of the investigation from excessive force to
dishonesty?
A

I never changed the nature of the

complaint.
Q

So, we're here on an excessive force

complaint?
A

No.

I'm saying when I interviewed

Officer Lucas, I was interviewing him -- I didn't
make him be dishonest, I didn't change it, Officer
Lucas did.
Q

I understand.

When you interviewed

Officer Lucas on the 12th, you told him specifically
the nature the charge was excessive force; right?
A

In the very beginning of my statement,

that's exactly what it was.
MR. HALL:

Bryon -- do me a favor, Bryon.

Ask the question and give him the courtesy to give an
answer fully and completely before you ask the next

WENDY S. ALCOCK -- CAPITOL REPORTERS

nu

Page 188

question•
MR. BENEVENTO:

I thought I was.

I'm

sorry if I didn't.
Q

(BY MR. BENEVENTO)

Lt. Fondaco, on the

12th, isn't is true that when you first started to
interview Officer Lucas that he wanted to know what
the nature of the complaint was, but you didn't
volunteer it?
A

Yes, I said that.

Q

And it was only until he insisted that he

wouldn't answer questions that you finally told him
it was excessive force?
A

Yes.

Q

That's a violation of policy; isn't it?

A

I guess it would have been, had the

investigation continued at that point.

But since he

wanted it, I gave it to him.
Q

So, he didn't get any written

notification of what it was about, and you told him
it was excessive force during the investigation?
Having known that Officer Snow said the gun was out
prior to taking his statement, when Officer Lucas
said, "It was in my holster," did you confront him
with that?
A

I asked him four or five times, yes, to
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1

clarify that, just so I could get it straight,

2

Q

3

gun was out"?

4

A

No.

5

Q

Why not?

6

A

I don't tell burglars I have witnesses,

7

either.

8

Q

9

Did you say, "Well, Officer Snow said the

So, you had already concluded that he had

violated the law?

10

A

No, that isn't what I said.

You asked me

11

why I didn't tell him.

12

interviewing someone, you don't tell them everything

13

you have.

14

Q

I'm telling you, when you're

You don't tell an officer that another

15

officer saw him with his gun out when he says it was

16

in?

17

A

No.

18

Q

You don't think that might elicit memory

19

recall?

20

A

21
22
23
24
25

If he's being completely honest with me,

he has memory recall.
Q

Can people be honest and forgetful at the

same time?
A

I think you probably forget certain

facts, yes.
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go this far.

And so, it took me that long, just

looking into things and dealing with it.
Q

In your opinion, what is the most

important characteristic that a police officer must
possess?
A

Honesty, I think, above all.

be trusted.

He has to

He is out there, day in and day out, and

doing things and handling the public, and everything
that

does must be -- he must be trusted.
Q

Let me refer you to Exhibit 16.

It's

your letter of termination dated August 21, '96.

Had

you reached a conclusion on August 21st, 1996 that
you couldn't trust Officer Lucas any further?
A

That

t what I wrote in th

etter; that

is correct.
MR. HALL:

I have nothing further.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. BENEVENTO:
Q

Chief Killian, does your department

follow a policy of progressive discipline?
A

Yes.

Q

Would you describe for the Commission

what that policy is?
A

Progressive, in nature.

It just has --

one thing goes -- you give a day off -- you give a
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written reprimand, a verbal reprimand, then you go
into days off, and then I go into termination.
Q

And depending -- I'm sorry, go ahead.

A

So, that is the progression

The

progression can be done on a verbal reprimand by my
sergeants, by my lieutenants; it doesn't have to be
done by me.
Q

And also, to be fair to you, Chief, if an

incident's of such an egregious nature, you don't
have to go through each of those steps; do you?

You

can go to suspension or you can go to termination
without going through oral reprimand or written
reprimand, etc; right?
A

That's correct.

Q

Had Officer Lucas in his 12 years ever

been reprimanded orally or verbally on dishonesty?
A

Not by me.

Q

Had Officer Lucas ever been suspended for

dishonesty?
A

Not by me.

Q

Whenwas

t he complaint for excess i w e

force resolved?
A

When was that resolved?

r don't think

that has been resolved.

In my mind, I think that is

still sitting up there.

It's just something that was
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MR. S M I T H :

I w a s going to ask the same

question.
MR. F E R G U S O N :

Just a c o u p l e

questions.

When you first arrested the s u s p e c t s anc

w e r e out

in the field, did you b e l i e v e at that time that
had -- one of them had a w e a p o n ?

they

Did y o u b e l i e v e

that S p e g a r had a w e a p o n ?
THE W I T N E S S :
MR

FERGUSON:

c r o t c h area at that

No, I didn't.
Did you pat d o w n his

time?

THE W I T N E S S :

I did n o t .

MR. F E R G U S O N :

W h y not?

THE W I T N E S S :
c u s t o d y , you know.

I've got two m e n in

And if I w e r e to do that,

then

I'd have to give my u n d i v i d e d a t t e n t i o n to this g u y .
l e g s , m y 11 •• \ i ci s t r a p p e d a n d

If he clamped

the other one turns around, they can beat the crap
out of me.
MR. FERGUSON:

I think you said you'd got

them both handcuffed.
THE WITNESS:
MR. FERGUSON:

That's right.
Why didn't you pat them

down?
THE WITNESS:
that we're taught.

As I said, it's the methods

You know, just because someone is
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in handcuffs doesr

mean that they can't hurt you.

It's an officer safety thing.
MR. FERGUSON:

I'm confused here.

I

don't mean to cut you off, but you said you reached
into his pocket and grabbed onto something that was a
hard object.

Why is that different than patting down

his crotch?
THE WITNESS:

It's not something that I

normally do, pat down someone's crotch, unless I have
a specific reason to do so.

In a cursory search,

when it's raining and it's dark, I'm just going to do
a quick pat down for my safety, handcuff him, and
take him in an office where it's lit and it's dry and
I can do a better job.

It's common practice here.

And it's something we have been doing for years.

And

I think it needs to be understood that I've done this
hundreds of times.

And I've taken hundreds of

weapons off of serious suspects.
MR. FERGUSON:

What's confusing to me as

a layperson is why, if you thought he had a weapon,
why you would let him put his hands anywhere near
where the weapon might be, if you already had the
opportunity with him being handcuffed to make sure he
didn't have a weapon.
THE WITNE S S :

It's just \i it

i "i"« » J
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practice for me
a reason.

check a guy's crotch unless I have

Now, I knew he had tools with him.

I've

arrested a number of vehicle burglars before, they
always have tools in their pockets.

So, maybe I was

a little complacent in assuming it was merely tools,
which it was.

But when he went for his crotch, for

reasons unbeknownst to me, I had to react.

And I

just feel that he was beckoning a reaction from me.
MR. FERGUSON:

Did you believe at that

time, then, that he was going for a weapon?
THE WITNESS:
MR. FERGUSON:

I did.
Did you ever tell Chief

Killian that?
THE WITNESS:

I told him that he went for

his crotch.
Ml

ERGUSON:

Did you ever tell anybody

during any of these interviews that you thought he
was going for a weapon at that time?
THE WITNESS:

I believe that I

articulated myself quite specifically as to why.
MR. FERGUSON:

That he was going for a

weapon?
THE WITNESS:

Sure.

In i»' c P nt times,

we've arrested people that are stashing 25-caliber
automatics in their crotch, so they were aware of the
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danger in the situation and my concern.

It wasn't

something that I had to articulate with them.
MR. FERGUSON:

So, if he was going for a

weapon, how were you trained to react to that if you
believe he's actually going for a lethal weapon?
THE WITNESS:

Just as I did:

physically, and going for my weapon.

Verbally,

And I think the

thing that brought it to a halt is an immediate
compliance to what I told him.

I pushed him and

said, "Put your hands on the wall," and he couldn't
get there fast enough.

Aiid he held perfectly still,

which put an end to it.
Now, had it continued, yes,
escalated.

would have

I would have physically had to take

control of him or drop him.

If I felt that wasn't

possible, then I would have had to pull my weapon and
decide whether to use it or not.

And I think

everyone has to realize, this is made -- this
decision is a split second.

But being that he did

comply, further action was not necessary.

sti

MR. FERGUSON:

Anything further?

THE CHAIRMAN:

Don't take this down.

concerned about the hard object in

I'm
n.

Did you ever find out what it was or where it was?
THE WITNESS:

It was a pair of pliers
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